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Ernest a. Young 
The Constitution Outside the Constitution 
abstract.   Countries lacking a single canonical text define the “constitution” to include all 
laws that perform the constitutive functions of creating governmental institutions and conferring 
rights on individuals. The British Constitution, for example, includes a variety of constitutive 
statutes, such as the Magna Carta and the Parliament Acts. This Article proposes a thought 
experiment: what if we defined the U.S. Constitution by function, rather than by form? Viewed 
from this perspective, “the Constitution” would include not only the canonical document but 
also a variety of statutes, executive materials, and practices that structure our government. What 
these constitutive materials lack is a third characteristic shared by some (but not all) 
constitutions: formal entrenchment against legal change. Decoupling the entrenching function 
from the constitutive functions offer a relatively simple answer to one of the most important 
problems in constitutional theory: how do we explain the evident fact that the structure of our 
government and the rights of the people have changed pervasively since the Founding, in ways 
that are simply not reflected in Article V amendments to the canonical text? The answer is that 
the constitutional order can change in this way because most of it was never entrenched in the 
canonical text to begin with. Most of the salient changes—the growth of the administrative state, 
the proliferation of individual entitlements—are changes to our “constitution outside the 
constitution” that are neither mandated nor forbidden by the canonical document. This 
functional account of constitutionalism also has implications for constitutional doctrine and 
scholarship. It tends to undermine doctrinal prescriptions grounded in a sharp dichotomy 
between constitutional and statutory claims, and it suggests that basic constitutional values—
such as federalism or concern for individual rights—are relevant to statutory construction. 
Finally, the functional account suggests a broader set of concerns for constitutional law teaching 
and scholarship.  
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introduction 
There is the notion that the primary source of information as to what our 
Constitution comes to, is the language of a certain Document of 1789, together 
with a severely select coterie of additional paragraphs called Amendments. Is 
this not extraordinary?1 
My central claim in this Article is that the American “constitution” consists 
of a much wider range of legal materials than the document ratified in 1789 and 
its subsequent amendments. To clarify what I mean, it will help to begin with a 
thought experiment derived from comparative constitutional experience. It has 
long been said that the English have an “unwritten” constitution. This, 
however, is clearly untrue. As Adam Tomkins has pointed out, 
“notwithstanding its allegedly unwritten nature, much (indeed, nearly all) of 
the [English] constitution is written, somewhere.”2 The Magna Carta, the Bill 
of Rights of 1689, the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, the European 
Communities Act of 1972, the Human Rights Act of 19983—these all form parts 
of the English constitution, and they are all written down. As Professor 
Tomkins explains, “[t]he unhappily misleading phrase, ‘written constitution’ 
really means ‘codified constitution.’ Thus, a written, or codified, constitution is 
one in which all the principal constitutional rules are written down in a single 
document named ‘The Constitution.’”4 That single codified document is what 
the English lack. 
In a polity without a codified constitution, the content of “The 
Constitution” must be derived functionally, not formally. Matthew Palmer has 
described this perspective as “constitutional realism” that “seeks to identify the 
nature of a constitution through observing its operation in reality.”5 The 
 
1.  K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934). 
2.  ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 7 (2003). I place to one side the role of “conventions” in the 
English tradition. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, at xxii-xxxi (8th ed. 1915) (discussing the distinction between 
“constitutional law” and “conventions of the constitution”). These are important, but they 
are not the primary reason people say that the English constitution is unwritten. 
3.  See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68 (Eng.); 
Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 (Eng.); Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 
35 (Eng.); Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 10 HALSBURY’S STATUTES 
OF ENGLAND AND WALES 42 (4th ed. 2007); Magna Carta, reprinted in 10 HALSBURY’S 
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra, at 18. 
4.  TOMKINS, supra note 2, at 7. 
5.  Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism To Identify the Complete Constitution: 
Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 592-93 (2006). 
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functional perspective predates the realist movement, however. As early as 
1908, A.V. Dicey defined English constitutional law to include “all rules which 
directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign 
power in the state.”6 Hence, we know that the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 
1949—defining the role of the House of Lords in the legislative process—are 
part of the English Constitution because of what they do, not because they have 
any formal markers that set them off from ordinary legislation.7 
The thought experiment that I wish to propose involves thinking of the 
American constitutional order in the same way, despite the fact that we purport 
to have a codified constitution. It is possible to identify, in the abstract, certain 
functions that constitutions perform. In England, whatever laws actually 
perform those functions are considered part of “the constitution.”8 What if we 
thought of the United States’ legal system in the same way? What would our 
“constitution” look like then?9 
My descriptive claim is that much—perhaps even most—of the 
“constitutional” work in our legal system is in fact done by legal norms existing 
outside what we traditionally think of as “the Constitution.”10 A constitution 
 
6.  DICEY, supra note 2, at 22. 
7.  See, e.g., id. at 6 (observing that an English scholar “may search the statute-book from 
beginning to end, but he will find no enactment which purports to contain the articles of the 
constitution; he will not possess any test by which to discriminate laws which are 
constitutional or fundamental from ordinary enactments”); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and 
Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 152, 153 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (“In the thin sense it is tautological that 
every legal system includes a constitution. For in that sense the constitution is simply the 
law that establishes and regulates the main organs of government, their constitution and 
powers, and ipso facto it includes law that establishes the general principles under which the 
country is governed . . . .”). Both Parliament Acts significantly limited the power of the 
House of Lords to veto or delay legislation enacted by the Commons. 
8.  That, at least, is the traditional conception of English public law. Recent developments, such 
as the integration of Britain into the European Union, have pressed in the direction of a 
distinction between “higher” and “ordinary” law. Cf. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND 
SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 4 (2000) 
(suggesting that Britain is shifting away from a “political constitution” that is not set above 
ordinary legislation); Paul Craig, Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Review, 54 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 147 (2001) (discussing emerging forms of English judicial review of domestic 
legislation that may conflict with European law). 
9.  Matthew Palmer has proposed a similar inquiry, grounded in a comparison with the 
“unwritten” constitution of his native New Zealand. See Palmer, supra note 5; see also 
Matthew S.R. Palmer, What Is New Zealand’s Constitution and Who Interprets It? 
Constitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders, 17 PUB. L. REV. 133 (2006). 
10.  Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Constitutionalism in a System of Judicial Supremacy, in THE 
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 431, 
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generally does three primary things: It constitutes the government, that is, it 
establishes the various institutions of the government and sets out their powers 
and obligations. It identifies certain rights of individuals against that 
government. And (sometimes) it entrenches these structures against change, 
absent compliance with a difficult amendment procedure. A moment’s 
reflection, however, reveals that under our modern institutional arrangements, 
the first two of these functions are no longer exclusively, or even primarily, 
performed by constitutional norms. (I shall have more to say about the third 
function—entrenchment—later on.) For virtually all practical purposes, the 
boundary between federal and state power is set by the terms of federal 
statutes; likewise, statutes and regulations play a far more significant role in 
regulating the separation of powers at the national level than do constitutional 
rules. Many of our most important individual rights—rights against 
discrimination based on age or disability, rights to welfare, medical care, and 
social security—stem from statutes rather than the Constitution. Even the basic 
electoral structure of our democracy is created and regulated by an assortment 
of nonconstitutional federal and state law rules. 
Consider, for example, the Federal Communications Act.11 That Act divides 
authority between the Congress and the Executive by delegating certain 
functions to an agency;12 it further delegates some tasks to state governments 
while reserving others to federal authority.13 The Act also confers both 
substantive and procedural rights on regulated entities and individuals.14 From 
a functional point of view, the Communications Act might truly be described 
 
431 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (suggesting that fundamental U.S. 
structural legislation would be considered “constitutional” in England). 
11.  47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2000). 
12.  E.g., id. § 154(i) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and 
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in 
the execution of its functions.”). 
13.  E.g., id. § 152(b) (assigning regulatory authority over interstate and intrastate telephone 
service to the Federal Communications Commission and the state utility commissions, 
respectively). 
14.  For substantive rights, see, for example, id. § 202 (conferring a right against common 
carriers to be free from “unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, 
classifications, regulations, facilities, or services”); id. § 222 (conferring a right on customers 
to ensure the privacy of their consumer information); id. § 251 (conferring on companies 
seeking to enter local telephone markets the right to interconnect with the incumbent local 
exchange carrier); id. § 254(b) (creating at least an aspirational right to universal 
telecommunications services, as well as institutional mechanisms to pursue that goal); and 
id. § 255 (conferring a right of access to telecommunications services on persons with 
disabilities). For procedural rights, see, for example, id. § 208 (creating procedures for 
complaints to the Commission). 
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as a “constitution” in its own right. To be sure, the Act is not “entrenched” in 
the sense that it can only be modified by constitutional amendment. On the 
other hand, the broad range of important interests, both individual and 
commercial, that the Act balances and protects ensures that it is, as a practical 
matter, quite difficult to alter in any sort of fundamental way.15 
It is time we recognized and thought systematically about the fact that 
much of the law that constitutes our government and establishes our rights 
derives from legal materials outside the Constitution itself. When lawyers talk 
about the Constitution being “open ended,” they generally mean that 
constitutional norms themselves can be extended to cover unforeseen changes 
in technology or mores: the Fourth Amendment now covers wiretapping;16 the 
Due Process Clause now covers abortion.17 The more important sense of open 
endedness, however, lies in the extent to which the Constitution permits basic 
constitutive questions to be answered by subconstitutional norms. My point is 
emphatically not that the Constitution is irrelevant to most of today’s legal 
problems. However, its relevance typically takes the form of a set of outside 
limits and a source of general constitutional values. The particular rules 
enshrined in the Constitution will themselves rarely have significant bite on 
our most important constitutional controversies.18 
We can thus better understand our legal order if we decouple the 
constitutive function of a constitution from the entrenchment function. Other 
scholars, from Karl Llewellyn in the 1930s to Bruce Ackerman, William 
Eskridge, John Ferejohn, and many others today, have recognized that our 
political order is constituted by norms existing outside the canonical 
document.19 But they have insisted on treating these extracanonical norms as 
 
15.  For example, the landmark amendments to the Act in 1996, Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), came 
only after years of extraordinarily complex bargaining among affected governmental and 
industry constituencies. For a short overview of the changes, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123 (1996). 
16.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending the Fourth Amendment to govern 
wiretapping). 
17.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a constitutional right to an abortion). 
18.  This is partly because the core operations of many of the most important clauses in the 
Constitution—such as those setting forth the general structure of the branches of 
government—are uncontroversial and rarely litigated. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). But I want to press the further point that even these clauses 
leave many or even most questions of both broad structure and institutional detail to be 
worked out through subconstitutional rules. 
19.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1215, 1215 (2001); Llewellyn, supra note 1. 
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“higher law,” which puts their theories on a collision course with Article V and 
creates a great deal of pressure to develop an alternative rule of recognition to 
identify those norms that have achieved this higher status. If one is going to 
confer entrenched constitutional status on a norm that has not gone through 
Article V ratification—on the institutional innovations of the New Deal, for 
example—then one needs a highly determinate way to identify both which 
norms have achieved this status and what their precise content is. This rule of 
recognition problem has loomed large in critiques of alternative theories of 
constitutional change, as well as more general approaches to interpretation 
predicated on a “living constitution.”20 
My aim is more modest. I want to suggest that the set of norms that 
“constitutes” our government is in fact much broader than the set of norms 
that is constitutionally entrenched. A statute like the 1934 Act creating the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may be constitutive of an 
institution without having any “higher law” status making it more difficult to 
change.21 Decoupling constitutive function from entrenched status decreases 
the pressure to confine the class of constitutive enactments to a narrow and 
precisely defined category of norms. In fact, it would be fair to say that most 
laws have some constitutive aspects, to the extent that they create a 
government post, empower an institution, or confer a right. The fact that 
ordinary laws perform these functions is important, but it does not make them 
any less ordinary. 
Decoupling the constitutive and entrenchment functions has important 
implications for constitutional law. The first is to offer a relatively simple 
account of constitutional change outside the Article V amendment process. The 
second, more doctrinal implication is to undermine sharp distinctions between 
constitutional claims and claims under statutes and regulations, as those 
distinctions are currently applied or proposed in areas like statutory 
construction, federal jurisdiction, and civil rights remedies. Finally, broadening 
the definition of “constitutive” norms beyond those that are formally 
entrenched ought to expand the jurisdiction of constitutional scholars, both as 
to what we teach and what we study. 
Part I of this Article discusses three primary functions of constitutions—
establishing the institutions of government, conferring rights on individuals, 
 
20.  See infra notes 218-232 and accompanying text. 
21.  Some constitutive statutes and practices are entrenched, as a practical matter, because the 
functions they perform render them terribly difficult to dislodge: the Social Security Act 
comes to mind. See infra Subsection I.A.3. But I do not argue that this should be the case, and 
the set of rules and practices performing constitutive functions is broader than the set that 
has achieved some level of quasiconstitutional durability. 
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and entrenching these structures against easy change—and demonstrates that 
ordinary law frequently performs each of these roles. Part II argues for 
decoupling the constitutive and entrenching functions and explores the 
implications of that move for theories of constitutional change. Part III then 
traces the implications of this approach for constitutional doctrine and 
scholarship. 
i. our extracanonical constitution 
Exposition of my argument requires ready terms differentiating between 
the document generally designated as “the Constitution”—the one ratified in 
1789, formally amended several times since, and passed out in handy pocket-
size booklets by the Federalist Society—and those legal norms existing outside 
that document that nonetheless perform constitutional functions. It will not do 
to distinguish between “written” and “unwritten,” because (as in England) the 
overwhelming bulk of the “constitution outside the Constitution” is, in fact, 
written down in statutes and regulations. Functionally speaking, one might 
distinguish the “entrenched” Constitution that can only be amended through 
the rigorous Article V procedure from various unentrenched norms that may be 
changed by other processes, including ordinary legislation. I want to suggest, 
however, that entrenchment is more multifarious than binary and that 
ordinary legislation performs important entrenching functions. For lack of a 
better term, I will refer to a “canonical” Constitution and an “extracanonical” 
constitution that exists alongside the canonical text. 
I begin with an overview of the ways in which extracanonical materials 
perform crucial constitutional functions in our system. I then develop some 
case studies in greater detail, focusing on three decisions from the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 Term. Finally, I conclude this Part with a brief typology of 
extracanonical functions. 
A. Extracanonical Materials and Constitutional Functions 
To make the case that much of the “constitutional” work in our legal 
system is done by extracanonical norms, one first needs a catalog of 
constitutional functions. I want to focus on three such functions here: First, 
constitutions “constitute” the government by creating governmental 
institutions, prescribing procedures by which those institutions operate, and 
allocating powers and responsibilities among the various institutions thus 
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created.22 Second, constitutions typically confer certain rights on individuals as 
against government action.23 Finally, many constitutions entrench certain 
institutional structures and individual rights by making those arrangements 
relatively difficult to change.24 
I do not insist on this particular typology of constitutional functions. 
Others have described them somewhat differently.25 I expect my argument 
could be replicated for just about any other function one might attribute to a 
constitution. If constitutions are meant to embody the basic aspirations and 
values of a society, for example, then it is easy to cite examples where those 
basic commitments are more readily found in statute. Our national 
commitments to environmental stewardship, intergenerational responsibility, 
and a free market economy are easier to discern in the Clean Water Act,26 the 
Social Security and Medicare regimes,27 and the Sherman Act28 than in the 
Constitution itself. In any event, my point is not to develop an exhaustive 
definition of constitutional functions, but simply to identify enough key 
functions to test the hypothesis that these functions are often performed by 
ordinary law. 
 
22.  See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra 
note 7, at 64, 65 (defining as “‘constitutional essentials’” the “plan of political government—
offices, branches, levels, procedures, power distributions, and competency ranges”); cf. 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1 (1999) (“The Constitution is a governing document. It defines 
and constrains the way government operates and politics is conducted in the United 
States.”). 
23.  See Michelman, supra note 22, at 65 (also listing as a “‘constitutional essential[]’” the “list of 
personal rights and liberties, if any, that the constituted government is ‘bound to respect’”). 
24.  See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, What Is “the Constitution”? (and Other Fundamental Questions), in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 7, at 99, 103; Raz, supra note 7, at 153. Some might identify 
a separate “trumping” function to signify the invalidation of legal rules inconsistent with the 
constitution itself, but I take this to be simply a manifestation of the constitution’s 
entrenchment against change through subconstitutional means. 
25.  Adam Tomkins’s helpful discussion, for instance, divides the constitutive function into 
“creation of the institutions of the State,” “regulat[ing] the relations between those 
institutions and one another,” and “regulat[ing] the relations between those institutions 
and the people (citizens) they govern.” TOMKINS, supra note 2, at 3. Because Professor 
Tomkins focuses on the British system, he understandably omits entrenchment from his list 
of key constitutional tasks. 
26.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
27.  42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397jj (2000). 
28.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). 
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1. Constituting the Government 
The first function of a constitution is to “constitute” the government. This 
includes creating governmental institutions, specifying their composition and 
methods for selecting officers, conferring powers upon them, establishing 
operational procedures, and drawing the boundaries of their jurisdictions. 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, to take the most obvious example, vests 
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress,”29 divides that 
Congress into two houses, specifies the composition of each house and the 
apportionment of representatives among the states, confers enumerated 
powers on the institution thus created, and prescribes procedures by which 
legislation may be enacted. Articles II and III perform similar functions for the 
executive and judicial branches, albeit in considerably less detail. 
All this is elementary. My claim, however, is that massively complex legal 
systems like our own require a great deal of constituting, and relatively little of 
it is done by the canonical Constitution. Of the 2,677,999 civilian persons 
employed by the national government in 2006,30 only 546 were Presidents, 
Vice Presidents, Supreme Court Justices, or members of Congress. The rest 
served in positions created not by the Constitution, but by federal statutes or 
regulations.31 Most of these officers are selected and supervised according to 
legislation creating the modern civil service.32 Many great institutions of 
national government—the vast administrative bureaucracies of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the FCC, or the Social Security 
Administration, for example—are nowhere to be found in the canonical 
Constitution. These institutions produce a solid majority of federal law.33 But 
these powerful agencies are created by their organic statutes, organized 
according to presidential directives, and regulated by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and a host of judge-made “common law” requirements.34 
 
29.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
30.  U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., EMPLOYMENT AND TRENDS: JANUARY 2006 tbl.1 (2006), 
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/html/2006/january/table1.asp. 
31.  This is also true of eight of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court, since the Constitution 
merely says there must be such a Court and does not specify the number of Justices. 
32.  See Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (creating the federal civil service); Farber, supra 
note 10, at 446. 
33.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“For some time, the 
sheer amount of law—the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the 
operation of government—made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking 
engaged in by Congress through the traditional process.”). 
34.  See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943) 
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Consider, for example, the Federal Reserve, which sets U.S. monetary 
policy and consequently affects the lives of every American. As a former 
governor notes, “[t]he Federal Reserve . . . is often called the most powerful 
institution in America.”35 One might expect to find such a powerful institution 
described in the Constitution. The proposed European Constitution, for 
example, devotes considerable space to the powers and structure of the 
European Central Bank.36 But our Federal Reserve was created by statute in 
1913, and many of the rules by which it operates are found in regulations 
promulgated by the Fed’s Board of Governors.37 It is hard to imagine what 
American economic policy would look like without this critical institution, yet 
it is “constituted” by legal materials existing entirely outside the canonical 
Constitution. 
Or consider what the canonical Constitution does not tell us about 
Congress, the institution the document discusses most extensively. The two 
most important questions concerning who can serve in Congress concern the 
content of the electorate: Who can vote in elections for Congress, and by what 
system? And how are the members of a state’s delegation to the House of 
Representatives to be apportioned geographically? Article I punts the first of 
these questions to the states,38 although their freedom is now circumscribed by 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and, more pervasively, the Voting 
Rights Act.39 As a result, voter qualifications are controlled primarily by a 
combination of state and federal statutory rules; most significant, the “first 
past the post” system for choosing House members is entirely a creature of 
statute and convention.40 Apportionment is, of course, controlled by a 
 
(requiring, as a matter of administrative common law, that an agency action can only be 
upheld by a reviewing court on the same grounds that the record discloses the agency’s 
action was originally based). 
35.   LAURENCE H. MEYER, A TERM AT THE FED: AN INSIDER’S VIEW, at xi (2004); see also MARTIN 
MAYER, THE FED: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION DRIVES THE MARKETS, at xi (2001) (observing that “[t]he Federal Reserve 
System is the most forceful participant in American economic governance”). 
36.  See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. I-30 & protocol 4, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 
O.J. (C 310) 1, 25, 225-246. 
37.  See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.); 12 C.F.R. §§ 201-281.1 (2007). 
38.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications 
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”). 
39.  Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2000) (amended 2006). 
40.  See Farber, supra note 10, at 447 (observing that this “basic feature[] of the American 
political system . . . exists only by congressional sufferance”). 
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constitutional rule—one man, one vote41—but it is a rule with fairly tenuous 
grounding in the canonical text and which might therefore be better described 
as a product of judge-driven constitutional evolution.42 And the most 
important issue of current controversy concerning apportionment—the legality 
and legitimacy of political gerrymandering—remains largely ungoverned by 
constitutional constraints.43 Many observers have noted that much of the 
character of our politics derives from the ability of state legislatures to create an 
overwhelming proportion of “safe” congressional seats,44 yet this vital 
constitutive dynamic remains largely outside the constraints imposed by the 
canonical Constitution. 
Once Congress is elected, its operations are likewise framed largely by 
extracanonical materials. True, the “finely wrought” process of bicameral 
consideration and presentment to the President is set forth in Article I, Section 
7, and the Court has been quite unwilling to countenance legislative 
modifications to that procedure.45 But there is a great deal more to the 
legislative process than bicameralism and presentment, and none of it is in the 
Constitution. Congress is pervasively structured along the lines of our two 
dominant political parties, which were largely unanticipated by the Framers 
and accordingly left entirely out of the canonical document.46 The progress of 
legislation, moreover, is dominated by the committee system, which is a 
creature not even of statute but of internal House and Senate rules. Even the 
basic principle that a bare majority in each house is sufficient to approve 
 
41.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
42.  See infra notes 248-250 and accompanying text (discussing judicial extrapolations from 
canonical text). 
43.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (rejecting a 
gerrymandering challenge for failure to agree on a workable doctrinal framework); Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (same). 
44.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 627-
28 (2002) (arguing that bipartisan gerrymandering tends to polarize congressional 
delegations). 
45.  See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the presidential line-item 
veto); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto). 
46.  See, e.g., Farber, supra note 10, at 446 (“[T]he most important single feature of the modern 
political system [parties] gains legal recognition only through legislation.”); Larry D. 
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
215, 269-70 (2000) (“The Founders had not anticipated, or even imagined, the formation of 
political parties in the modern sense of the term, though they undoubtedly would have been 
appalled by the prospect had they thought of it. . . . No one envisaged extensive 
organizations with a general ideology that would act to coordinate political campaigns and 
organize the government to facilitate the implementation of a popular program; such a 
thing had never before existed.”). 
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legislation, not to mention some of the exceptions to that rule in the Senate, 
does not appear in the Constitution. It exists simply as a matter of legislative 
convention.47 To see the point most starkly, imagine if Congress were forced to 
operate with only the rules actually set forth in the canonical text of the 
Constitution. It is hard to imagine how it could possibly proceed. 
In noting these facts, I do not mean to argue that these extracanonical 
institutions and constitutive rules are “unconstitutional.” The Constitution 
clearly contemplates that additional officers will serve alongside those 
specifically identified in the text: it empowers Congress to create Article III 
courts other than the Supreme Court, provides rules for the appointment of 
principal and inferior officers, and authorizes the President to require the 
written opinions of the “heads of departments.”48 And it is impossible to 
imagine that the Framers could have intended to deny Congress the power to 
organize itself or select an appropriate voting rule for the passage of legislation. 
The Constitution is not a suicide pact,49 and it is also not a nonstarter. My 
point is simply that the canonical Constitution leaves a very great deal of this 
essential work to be done by other legal materials. 
We might identify a narrower sense in which a constitution “constitutes” a 
government—that is, it provides a “rule of recognition” by which we can tell 
what norms count as “law” within our legal system. The rule of recognition, as 
developed by H.L.A. Hart, “provides validity criteria that, directly or indirectly, 
determine the legal status of all other rules.”50 It is tempting to suppose that 
providing such a rule is, in fact, a key function of constitutions. Hence, the 
validity of a legal rule in the U.S. legal system depends on its having been 
promulgated pursuant to the lawmaking procedures laid out in Article I and on 
its consistency with the individual rights articulated elsewhere in the 
document. If the Constitution does not actually establish all the institutions of 
 
47.  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative 
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 486 (1995) (“The Constitution’s 
failure to specify a proportion necessary to pass a bill, combined with the delegation of 
authority to each house under the Rules of Proceedings Clause, suggests that the 
Constitution permits each house to decide how many members are necessary to pass a 
bill.”). 
48.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (power to create courts other than the Supreme Court); id. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointment of “inferior officers”); id. cl. 1 (opinions of heads of 
departments). 
49.  See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
50.  Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices 
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 731 (2006). See generally H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 90-94 (1961). 
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our government, perhaps it at least sets forth the criteria by which the validity 
of those institutions (and their works) can be judged. 
This recognition function has the virtue of being sufficiently fundamental 
to fit our intuition about the special dignity of constitutions. But it does not 
withstand scrutiny. Most scholars seem to agree that a rule of recognition is a 
social fact, in the sense that it identifies the criteria that will cause the relevant 
class of officials to accept a norm as a rule of law.51 Obviously one cannot refer 
to the criteria of Article I or the Supremacy Clause’s simple statement that 
“[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land”52 to determine 
that the Constitution is, in fact, supreme law; after all, any spurious document 
(even the one you are reading) might likewise affirm that it is the supreme law. 
If we have to resort to some prior criterion to determine that the document 
drafted in Philadelphia in 1787, and not some competitor document, is the 
supreme law, then that criterion would provide the ultimate rule of 
recognition—not the Constitution itself.53 
One might concede this much and say that while a constitution may require 
a priori validation at the outset, once it is in place it provides the validity 
criteria for all subsequent legal norms within the legal system.54 This is 
certainly true to some extent: we are well accustomed to saying that an 
otherwise valid legal rule will be invalid if it transgresses some principle in the 
Constitution. But compliance with the Constitution’s criteria is sometimes not 
a necessary, and often not a sufficient, condition for legal validity in our 
system.55 As Bruce Ackerman has demonstrated, it is very difficult to square the 
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments with the formal requirements for 
 
51.  See, e.g., Raz, supra note 7, at 161; Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a 
Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 150 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
52.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
53.  For a similar rejection of the Constitution as a rule of recognition, see Raz, supra note 7, at 
160-61. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1291 (1995) (observing 
that “[u]ltimately, one must step outside the Constitution—as with any legal text—to 
identify criteria for legitimating that body of law”). 
54.  See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 78 
(1996) (“A constitution is defined as a constitution in large part by the fact that it provides a 
nation with rules of recognition for all other laws.”); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms 
of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 781-82 (1995) 
(arguing that Article I’s presentment and bicameralism requirements provide a “rule of 
recognition” for valid federal legislation). 
55.  See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
621 (1987) (discussing the complicated relationship between the Constitution and the rule of 
recognition). 
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ratification in Article V.56 The authority of those amendments thus must stem 
from some combination of traditional acceptance and current agreement with 
the values they embody. Hence, our preconstitutional ultimate rule of 
recognition, predicated on social acceptance, seems to operate even after the 
initial act of constitutional founding. Satisfaction of the document’s own 
terms, in other words, is not always a necessary condition for legal validity in 
our system.57 
More frequently, satisfaction of the constitutional criteria is not a sufficient 
condition for legal validity. All state laws, for instance, must also satisfy 
whatever validity criteria are set out in the relevant state constitution.58 Even if 
we confine the inquiry to federal legal rules, the majority of those rules are 
administrative in character rather than statutory. As such, they must satisfy 
various validity criteria set out in the Administrative Procedure Act and the 
organic statute of the relevant administrative agency. More fundamentally still, 
even federal statutes must satisfy validity criteria other than those set out in the 
Constitution. That document, after all, never sets out the voting rules that will 
govern statutory enactment. The basic criterion that approval requires a bare 
majority of each house is thus fixed by custom, not by the Constitution itself. 
The inescapable conclusion is that, while satisfaction of constitutional 
criteria is an important component of a legal rule’s validity, those criteria 
hardly capture the entire range of conditions that rules must satisfy in order to 
be valid within our legal system. The ultimate rule of recognition in our 
system—in any system, most likely—is something so basic that it transcends 
even the constitutional text. And to the extent that the Constitution does serve 
as a rule of legal validity, this constitutive function, like the others I have 
already discussed, is shared between the constitutional text and a variety of 
other rules and provisions in the system. 
2. Conferring Rights on Individuals 
Conferring rights fits somewhat uncomfortably with the other 
constitutional functions that I have discussed so far. The others involve 
“constitutive” rules—rules about rulemaking, if you will—that are relatively 
 
56.  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-119 (1998) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]. 
57.  Likewise, as Louis Fisher has shown, legislative veto arrangements continue to be respected 
long after they were held inconsistent with Article I in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Autumn 1993, at 273, 288. 
58.  See Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 645-47. 
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distinct from “substantive” rules like prohibiting murder or setting the 
permissible amount of a chemical in the drinking water. Rights, by contrast, 
often seem more substantive in their orientation—the right to bear arms or to 
obtain an abortion, for instance. This difference from the constitutive functions 
of constitutions may be more apparent than real, however. Rights perform a 
key constitutive function by setting the bounds of government power and 
constraining the exercise of government discretion.59 The great bulk of our 
rights guarantees are procedural in nature,60 and provisions like the Speech, 
Press, and Establishment Clauses can all be thought of as “constituting” a 
transparent and open political process as well as a public space for political, 
social, and religious debate free of governmental distortion. Even the right to 
bear arms has a constitutive dimension, to the extent that it was originally 
intended to create a military counterweight to potentially oppressive 
governments.61 
In any event, individual human rights loom so large in our modern 
constitutional consciousness that it would be impossible to leave them off of 
any reasonable list of constitutional functions. But one also does not have to 
look far to see that many of our most important human rights are not part of 
the canonical Constitution. To begin with, some of our canonical rights are 
dependent on rights created elsewhere. One of the most important rights in the 
early Republic was the right against state impairment of contracts.62 That 
right, however, only kicks in once state law has recognized contractual rights in 
the first place.63 The same thing is true of property rights: the Federal 
 
59.  As Richard Kay has explained, “[c]onstitutions restrict the reach of the state by a proper 
specification of what it may and may not do. They may do this by defining an exclusive 
grant of public power and/or by removing from its control certain favored private activities.” 
Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 7, at 16, 22. 
60.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 92 (1980); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble 
with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 531 (2003). 
61.  See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 651 
(1989) (demonstrating that “one aspect of the structure of checks and balances within the 
purview of 18th century thought was the armed citizen”). 
62.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Obligation of Contract, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 171, 172 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (noting that the Contract Clause 
was “the focal point of litigation for those who sought to protect economic liberties against 
state intervention” in the antebellum period). 
63.  See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (noting that the existence of a 
contract, as predicate to a Contract Clause claim, is a question of state law); Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 259 (1827). 
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Constitution says they cannot be “taken” without just compensation, but they 
are generally created in the first instance by state law.64 
The more basic point, however, is that many rights that are fundamental 
for individuals in modern America are entirely creatures of statute. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment in Texas v. 
Johnson,65 I am unlikely—to put it mildly—to exercise my right to burn an 
American flag. I do worry that I or someone close to me might one day be 
discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, age, or disability, and in that 
event I would look first to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,66 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act,67 or the Americans with Disabilities Act68 
for protection and relief rather than the Equal Protection Clause, even if the 
perpetrator is a state actor.69 Even more obviously, American constitutional 
culture has generally been reluctant to recognize positive rights to housing, 
food, health care, or economic security, but we have created elaborate statutory 
entitlements to such benefits under the Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and unemployment assistance 
regimes.70 One suspects that millions of our citizens value these entitlements 
 
64.  See, e.g., Philips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Constitution 
protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is 
determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972))). 
65.  491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
66.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
67.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). 
68.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000). 
69.  I confine my discussion here to “vertical” rights of individuals against governments, not 
“horizontal” rights of one person against another. It would be interesting to explore the 
constitutive functions of private law, but that excursion must await another day. 
70.  For a variety of reasons, I want to resist in this discussion a sharp distinction between 
negative and positive rights or entitlements. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 
122-34 (1969). Positive entitlements constrain government discretion both in individual 
cases (by imposing duties on government actors) and on a structural level (by creating 
massive resource commitments that limit government freedom of action). Some canonical 
rights, moreover, are difficult to classify as negative or positive. Equal protection, for 
example, often confers a positive right to government benefits where those benefits are 
accorded to others, and remedies in this area often encounter all the difficulties ascribed to 
enforcement of positive rights. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (wrestling 
with the extent to which the Equal Protection Clause may require positive improvements in 
schools as a remedy for racial segregation). Many legal systems treat positive entitlements as 
equally central to their conception of human rights as negative freedoms. See, e.g., S. AFR. 
CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 24 (right to healthy environment); id. § 26 (right to housing); id. § 27 
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considerably more highly than many or most of their canonical rights. The 
point, in any event, is not to establish that statutory rights are more important 
than canonical ones—just that many important individual rights derive from 
extracanonical sources.71 
Finally, and more controversially, there are rights conferred by 
international law. Agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations confer on 
foreigners in our midst important rights against American governments.72 
With respect to our own citizens, the traditional assumption has been that 
international human rights are redundant with domestic constitutional 
protections, and the Senate has often attached reservations to human rights 
treaties designed to ensure that international rights sweep no more broadly 
than domestic constitutional rights within the domestic legal system. One 
wonders how long these assumptions will hold, however, as human rights 
discourse becomes increasingly global in character. International law and 
foreign practice already shape interpretation of the canonical Constitution in 
some areas,73 and their strictures are sometimes incorporated into federal 
statutes.74 Treaties and customary international law seem likely to be an 
 
(right to health care, food, and water); id. § 29 (right to education). Although I cannot 
pursue the point here, I expect it may make more sense to distinguish between negative and 
positive rights when choosing which rights to entrench than when describing the constitutive 
functions of legal norms. 
71.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 21-29 (1990) (describing President Franklin Roosevelt’s “second Bill of 
Rights” and the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s as conferring a wide range of 
entitlements on individuals, predominantly through legislation and regulatory activity). 
72.  North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057 
(conferring right on investors to be free from various forms of discrimination and 
expropriation); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (conferring a right on foreign nationals arrested within the territory of 
a signatory to consult with their home consulate). These treaties also serve constitutive 
functions to the extent that they integrate the United States into a system of supranational 
adjudication. See generally Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial 
System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1163-70 (2005) (discussing the interaction of supranational and 
domestic courts under NAFTA and the Vienna Convention). 
73.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (looking to foreign law to construe the 
meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment). 
74.  See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (current version codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1651 (2000)) (punishing “the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations”); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice incorporates the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War). 
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increasingly important source of individual rights against government action in 
the future. 
If conferring rights on individuals against government action is a basic 
function of constitutions, then all of these sources of rights are “constitutional” 
in nature. One need not disparage canonical rights to say that they form a mere 
subset of those rights that individuals value and depend upon in our legal 
system. The obvious difference, of course, is that canonical rights are 
entrenched against legal change in a way that statutory rights are not. I quibble 
with that distinction, however, in the next section. 
3. Entrenching Structures and Rights Against Change 
A third function of many—but not all—constitutions is to entrench certain 
legal arrangements against change. Entrenched norms “trump” subsequent 
conflicting enactments and actions, unless those subsequent measures 
themselves satisfy certain demanding criteria. Entrenchment is central to our 
American understanding of “constitutional” law; as Adam Tomkins has 
observed, the lack of entrenchment in Britain means that “there is no special 
significance attached to the adjective ‘constitutional,’” and “constitutional law 
is not sharply demarcated from other areas of law.”75 In America, by contrast, 
the difficulty of changing the canonical Constitution sets the legal 
arrangements created by that document sharply apart from all other 
arrangements, which may be changed by “ordinary” means. By conferring 
“higher law” status on certain norms, entrenchment facilitates the distinctive 
American practice of judicial review, by which courts invalidate government 
acts and laws contrary to the entrenched norm.76 Entrenchment may also 
contribute to the almost mystical pull that the Constitution exerts on most 
Americans: because the Constitution may not be changed by ordinary political 
means, it seems to exist as a timeless inheritance from our ancestors, set above 
the fray of current controversy. Indeed, if I am right that the constitutive and 
rights-creating functions of the Constitution are shared pervasively by all 
manner of other legal materials, then entrenchment may be all that sets the 
canonical Constitution apart from the rest of our legal system. 
 
75.  TOMKINS, supra note 2, at 16. 
76.  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803). This is not to say that 
one could not have entrenchment without judicial review, see, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, 
A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 18-25, only that one cannot have 
judicial review without some form of entrenchment. 
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The relationship between entrenchment and canonicity is considerably 
more complex than this, and I will have a good deal more to say about it later.77 
For now, I simply want to suggest that the relative entrenchment of an 
institution or legal principle is not solely a function of its inclusion in or 
exclusion from the canonical Constitution. Consider, for example, the relative 
likelihood that the following three norms will be fundamentally altered or 
abolished over the next ten years: 
(a)  the right to burn the American flag under the First Amendment; 
(b) the right to an abortion under the Due Process Clause; or 
(c)  the right to government support in old age under the Social 
Security Act. 
Does anyone disagree that this is the correct ranking, in descending order, 
of the likelihood of fundamental change? This is true even though probable 
mechanisms would be, respectively, a full-dress Article V amendment on flag 
burning, a change in the composition of the Supreme Court on abortion, and a 
mere statutory repeal of Social Security. Social Security is an unusual example, 
but it suggests that entrenchment is a function of more variables than simply 
the formal lawmaking method required to effect a change. Even constitutional 
change through the Article V gauntlet may, in some circumstances, be 
politically easier than eliminating or revising a longstanding statutory scheme 
backed by powerful constituencies. 
As another example, consider the recent controversy over Senate 
confirmation of judicial nominees. Although judicial nominees are ordinarily 
confirmed by majority vote, Senate rules provide that opponents of a nominee 
may block an up-or-down vote by filibuster, and that a resolution to cut off 
further debate and force a vote must have sixty or more votes to prevail.78 
When Senate Democrats, lacking a majority in the chamber, began 
filibustering a significant portion of President George W. Bush’s judicial 
nominees, Republicans threatened to change the Senate rules, which can be 
done by a mere majority vote, so as to forbid filibusters of judicial nominees. 
This proposal was promptly dubbed the “nuclear option” because it was 
perceived to be so disruptive of the Senate’s ordinary course of operations, and 
a significant number of Republicans who disapproved of the filibusters were 
 
77.  See infra Part II. 
78.  See S. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 107-1, at 
20-22 (2002). 
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nonetheless unwilling to vote to change the Senate’s rules.79 This was true 
notwithstanding that such rules are not even statutory, much less 
constitutional, provisions. The convention permitting filibusters had become 
sufficiently entrenched that politicians of both parties shied away from 
changing it in a way that they would hardly shrink from amending ordinary 
legislation.80 
Incorporating a principle into the canonical Constitution is thus not the 
only way to entrench it against future changes. That hardly means that 
canonization is not an effective means, although formal entrenchment did not 
save a number of once-important constitutional principles from effective 
desuetude.81 The important point for present purposes is that the canonical 
Constitution does not have a practical monopoly of any of the functions 
traditionally associated with constitutions. 
B. Three Cases 
The extracanonical constitution was on prominent display in the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 Term. This Section considers three of that Term’s cases: Gonzales 
v. Oregon,82 which traced the boundary between national and state power 
concerning the controversial practice of physician-assisted suicide; Rapanos v. 
 
79.  See, e.g., Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Filibuster Rule Change Opposed, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 
2005, at A1. 
80.  One might usefully compare the widespread aversion to changing the Senate’s filibuster 
convention with the widespread yawn that greeted claims that Texas presidential electors in 
the 2000 election violated the clear command of the Twelfth Amendment by voting for a 
presidential and a vice-presidential candidate who were both inhabitants of their own state. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII, § 1 (“The Electors shall . . . vote by ballot for President and 
Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with 
themselves . . . .”). The question whether Vice President Cheney was, in fact, a Texas 
inhabitant at the time was complicated; what was crystal clear, however, was that virtually 
no one cared about the answer. See generally Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s 
Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925 (2001) (belaboring the issue and 
speculating about why no one else cared). The fact that the Twelfth Amendment’s 
“Habitation Clause” is plainly part of the canonical Constitution cut no ice with the vast 
majority who (apparently) felt it no longer served any important purpose. 
81.  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 
(1994) (discussing the demise of several fundamental structural characteristics of the 
canonical Constitution—such as the doctrines of enumerated powers and nondelegation—in 
the absence of any relevant textual amendment). 
82.  546 U.S. 243 (2006). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I signed and participated in 
drafting an amicus brief in support of Oregon. See Brief for Professors of Law Briffault et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243 (No. 04-623), 2005 WL 
1707466. Unusually, Oregon won anyway. 
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United States,83 in which a property owner whose land had been designated as 
protected wetlands relied on rights created by the Clean Water Act84 rather 
than the Takings Clause; and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,85 probably the most 
important separation-of-powers case in recent memory, and one that 
highlights the extent to which both executive authority and individual liberty 
in the war on terror have come to be defined by extracanonical materials. 
1. The Statutory Safeguards of Federalism: Gonzales v. Oregon 
In Washington v. Glucksberg,86 the Supreme Court declined to recognize a 
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to physician-assisted suicide. 
The majority observed that “Americans are engaged in an earnest and 
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-
assisted suicide.”87 As part of that debate, the State of Oregon legalized 
physician-assisted suicide in 1994 under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 
(ODWDA).88 The lethal drugs dispensed by physicians under the ODWDA, 
however, are also subject to federal regulation under the Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA).89 In 1998 and 1999, opponents of physician-assisted suicide 
unsuccessfully sought to amend the CSA to explicitly foreclose state 
authorization of the practice.90 In 2001, however, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft issued an interpretive rule construing the CSA to foreclose use of 
regulated drugs for physician-assisted suicide.91 Gonzales v. Oregon evaluated 
the validity of this rule as an interpretation of the underlying statute. 
The circumstances of Gonzales—a challenge by terminally ill patients and 
their doctors to a federal restriction on physician-assisted suicide92—focused 
attention initially on two boundaries. The first was the line between individual 
autonomy and state control; the second divided national and state legislative 
 
83.  126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). 
84.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
85.  126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
86.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
87.  Id. at 735. 
88.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (2003). 
89.  21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000). 
90.  See H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998). See generally Gonzales 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 252-53 (2006) (describing these legislative initiatives). 
91.  66 Fed. Reg. 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
92.  The State of Oregon itself also joined in the challenge to the federal rule. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 
at 254. 
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authority. Both of these boundaries are “constitutional” ones in the sense that 
they concern the structure of public institutions and the rights of individuals 
against those institutions. But neither could be litigated as a constitutional 
claim in Gonzales. Glucksberg’s refusal to recognize a fundamental due process 
right foreclosed the rights claim, and the federalism claim looked no more 
promising in light of Gonzales v. Raich, which upheld Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority to stamp out California’s experiment with medical 
marijuana.93 The Oregon case was thus litigated in terms of a third boundary, 
between Congress’s reservation to itself of authority to set national drug policy 
in the CSA and its delegation of enforcement discretion to the Attorney 
General under the same statute. Rather than a holding about the Due Process 
or Commerce Clause, Gonzales produced an opinion about the scope and limits 
of Chevron deference to executive interpretations of congressional enactments. 
Gonzales illustrates the extent to which “ordinary” laws constitute the 
institutions and legal rights that bear on individuals’ most fundamental 
concerns. When Congress enacted the CSA in 1970, it did not simply impose a 
substantive prohibition on drug use; rather, it “creat[ed] a comprehensive 
framework for regulating the production, distribution, and possession of . . . 
‘controlled substances.’”94 Because many controlled drugs have legitimate 
medical uses, the Act regulates medical practice: doctors must register with 
federal authorities, and their ability to prescribe controlled drugs may be 
suspended or revoked if they fail to comply with federal rules.95 Although the 
CSA specifies some requirements in the text, it also delegates considerable 
rulemaking authority to the Attorney General and imposes procedural 
requirements on the exercise of that authority.96 Indeed, the dispute in 
Gonzales focused not only on the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions 
but also on the proper interpretation of a rule promulgated by an earlier 
Attorney General, which requires that all prescriptions be issued “for a 
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual 
course of his professional practice.”97 Finally, the CSA divides state and federal 
authority by disavowing any intent to preempt the field of drug regulation.98 
 
93.  545 U.S. 1 (2005). For an assessment of Raich, see Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? 
Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
94.  Raich, 545 U.S at 24. 
95.  21 U.S.C. §§ 822(a)(2), 824(a)(4) (2000). 
96.  Id. § 811. 
97.  21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2007). 
98.  21 U.S.C. § 903 (2000) (“No provision of this title shall be construed as indicating an intent 
on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates . . . to the 
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the 
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Oregon maintained that the individual right to physician-assisted suicide, 
which derived from state law in light of Glucksberg’s refusal to federalize the 
matter, fell within this area of state autonomy carved out by federal law. 
The primary dispute in Gonzales concerned whether the Attorney General’s 
interpretive rule, pronouncing that using controlled substances to assist suicide 
is not a legitimate medical practice, was entitled to deference under Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.99 That issue depended, in 
turn, on whether Congress had “delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law,” and the rule in question “was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”100 The Court ultimately 
concluded that the CSA did not delegate such authority concerning physician-
assisted suicide.101 In the absence of deference, the Court rejected the Attorney 
General’s “assertion of an expansive federal authority to regulate medicine” 
without needing “to consider the application of clear statement requirements 
. . . or presumptions against pre-emption.”102 Nonetheless, the Court’s reading 
of the statute was plainly influenced by a baseline assumption that primary 
responsibility for regulating the medical profession remains with the states.103 
Especially after Raich, the primary line between state and national authority 
concerns not what Congress could regulate, if it wished, but rather what 
Congress has regulated under the statutes it has actually enacted.104 There is 
 
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision . . . and that 
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.”). 
99.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). That rule provides that a court should defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable. See id. at 842-45. Chevron deference is itself a constitutive principle defining the 
separation of interpretive authority between the executive and judicial branches. That 
principle, of course, does not appear in the canonical Constitution. 
100.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
101.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257-68 (2006). 
102.  Id. at 273-74 (citing Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002); United 
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). 
103.  Id. at 270 (“The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning 
medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.”). 
104.  See id. at 302 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that any Commerce Clause challenge to 
the Attorney General’s rule “must fail” under Raich). This was the case long before Raich. 
See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THE COMPOUND REPUBLIC: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 6 (2001) (concluding that the Rehnquist Court’s decisions enforcing some 
constitutional limits on national authority “have not changed the day-to-day conduct of 
intergovernmental relations, having no effect, for example, on the ability of Congress to 
preempt state laws or to attach onerous and far-reaching conditions to grants-in-aid to the 
states”); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 64-65 (1998) (“The meaning of the Commerce Clause has been developed far more by 
numerous congressional enactments than by a handful of Supreme Court decisions . . . .”). 
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sufficient vigor in the “political safeguards of federalism”105 that Congress 
rarely pushes to the limits of its potential regulatory authority, and it typically 
leaves considerable swaths of policy autonomy to the states. Exactly how much 
is reserved, of course, depends on the construction of the relevant statutes and 
regulations.106 What I want to insist on is that the line drawn in Gonzales is no 
less “constitutive” of our governmental structure than the one drawn in Raich. 
These sorts of statutory boundaries have come to dominate the structure of 
American federalism as the canonical Commerce Clause boundary has been 
interpreted into irrelevance. 
What about the individual rights question in Gonzales? By refusing to 
recognize a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide under the Due 
Process Clause, Glucksberg left persons wishing to assert such a right in the care 
of the extracanonical constitution. In the absence of federal legislation on the 
subject, the people of Oregon derived their “right to die” from state law.107 The 
problem with state law rights, of course, is that they can be trumped by any 
valid federal law. The durability of such state law rights against federal 
intrusions thus depends on what sort of federal lawmaking is required in order 
to legislate on the subject at issue. Opponents of physician-assisted suicide 
tried, after all, to enact legislation preempting Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
Act, but they failed. They succeeded, however, in persuading Attorney General 
Ashcroft to promulgate an agency interpretive rule designed to achieve the 
same result. The durability of the Gonzales plaintiffs’ state law right to die thus 
turned on the allocation of lawmaking authority between Congress and the 
agency. In the absence of meaningful canonical constraints on legislative 
delegation,108 that too was a statutory question. 
The basic function of a constitution is to draw boundaries among the 
institutions of the government—between nation and state, between Congress 
and executive agencies, and between the government and individuals. In 
Gonzales v. Oregon, all of those boundaries were drawn by statutes and 
regulations rather than by constitutional text. Nor was Gonzales an unusual 
 
105.  See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) 
(arguing that the autonomy of the states is primarily protected by their representation in 
Congress, not by judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on national authority). 
106.  For an extended argument about the primacy of statutory construction in modern 
federalism disputes, see Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (2004). 
107.  Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (2003).  
108.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (declining to reinvigorate judicial 
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine). 
0408_YOUNG_0473.DOC 12/14/2007  1:07:31 PM 
the constitution outside the constitution 
433 
 
case in this regard. As the next Subsection demonstrates, the same thing is true 
in the area of environmental protection. 
2. The Clean Water Act as a Constitution: Rapanos v. United States 
Federal authorities sued John Rapanos, the owner and would-be developer 
of three parcels of land near Midland, Michigan, for backfilling fifty-four acres 
of designated wetlands without a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.109 
Mr. Rapanos’s activity ran afoul of section 301 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
which provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”110 The Act defines “pollutant” broadly to include ordinary solids like 
Rapanos’s dirt,111 and “the discharge of a pollutant” covers “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”112 Permits for such 
discharges may be issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or 
the Army Corps of Engineers, and issuing such permits constitutes a large 
proportion of the Corps’ work.113 Because Rapanos lacked such a permit, the 
litigation focused on whether the wetlands on his property fell within the 
regulatory jurisdiction conferred by the CWA. 
In the eyes of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, “the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers . . . exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot” in deciding 
whether to grant or deny a permit to develop wetlands.114 But in contrast to a 
despotic regime, the bureaucratic institutions that administer the CWA have 
virtually all the features of a constitutional government.115 The EPA, for 
example, contains lawmaking institutions, prosecutorial authorities, and 
administrative law courts for hearing cases arising under the environmental 
laws. Detailed procedural rules govern the exercise of all of these functions, and 
judicial review of the agency’s actions is available in federal courts under the 
 
109.  The Court consolidated Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006), with another 
Michigan case. See Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 546 U.S. 932 (2005) (mem.). The 
facts of Rapanos, however, will suffice for purposes of illustration here. 
110.  Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). 
111.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000). 
112.  Id. § 1362(12). 
113.  See id. § 1342(a) (permitting authority of the EPA); id. § 1344(a) (permitting authority of the 
Corps). 
114.  Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214 (plurality opinion). 
115.  Cf. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 4 (2004) 
(“[L]ike the Constitution itself, the CWA structures relationships between the United 
States, the states, and private entities.”). 
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Administrative Procedure Act.116 The Corps of Engineers has similar 
characteristics and functions, although unlike the EPA, its role in developing 
and protecting the nation’s natural resources goes back to the dawn of the 
Republic.117 The important point, of course, is that none of this institutional 
framework is in the canonical Constitution. The entire edifice is a product of 
statutes, regulations, and executive orders.118 
Rapanos was the third in a trilogy of cases addressing the reach of the 
Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction, which the CWA defines as covering “the waters 
of the United States.”119 Exercising delegated rulemaking authority under the 
Act, the Corps promulgates regulations further specifying the reach of its 
authority, and those regulations have adopted increasingly expansive readings 
of the statute over the years. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 
the Court upheld the Corps’ interpretation of “waters of the United States” to 
include wetlands that “actually abut[]” traditional navigable waters.120 The 
next case, Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,121 considered the 
validity of the Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule,” which asserted jurisdiction over 
any intrastate waters used as habitat by migratory birds.122 The Court rejected 
this rule, holding that the CWA could not support extension of the Corps’ 
jurisdiction to “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters”123 that did not 
“actually abut[] on a navigable waterway.”124 Rapanos involved a seemingly 
intermediate case: wetlands that intermittently drain into navigable waters 
located some distance away.125 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion held that the 
phrase “waters of the United States” in the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction 
only over “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” and that 
only wetlands with a “continuous surface connection” to such water are 
“adjacent” in the sense required by the statute.126 Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
concurring in the result, on the other hand, required only that the agency show 
 
116.  Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
117.  See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Brief History, http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/
history/brief.htm#1beg (last visited Aug. 30, 2007). 
118.  For an overview of the CWA’s development, see CRAIG, supra note 115, at 10-27. 
119.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). 
120.  474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985). 
121.  531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
122.  Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
123.  531 U.S. at 171. 
124.  Id. at 167. 
125.  See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2218 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
126.  Id. at 2225-26. 
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a “significant nexus” to navigable waters in order to assert jurisdiction over a 
wetland.127 
Had it arisen in the nineteenth century, Rapanos would have almost surely 
been a constitutional case under the Commerce and Takings Clauses. Like 
Gonzales v. Oregon, Rapanos implicated boundaries between federal and state 
regulatory authority and between individual rights and the public interest. 
Neither a Commerce Clause challenge to the Corps’ jurisdiction nor a 
regulatory takings challenge to the reduction in Rapanos’s property values 
would have had much chance under current law, however.128 The relevant 
boundaries are now defined by the CWA itself. The federal-state boundary 
resides in the statutory definition of “waters of the United States,” as 
interpreted by the EPA and the Corps. The individual right to develop one’s 
property is likewise defined primarily by the statutory criteria for granting 
permits.129 
As in Gonzales, the actual debate in Rapanos focused on the separation-of-
powers question of the Corps of Engineers’ authority to interpret the 
boundaries drawn by Congress in the CWA. The general burden of legislative 
inertia and the politically sensitive nature of environmental policy made the 
statutory boundaries in the CWA relatively hard to amend, lending those 
boundaries a degree of functional entrenchment—unless the Corps was 
accorded broad deference to reinterpret those boundaries in the exercise of its 
 
127.  Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). As the fifth vote and the narrower 
ground supporting the result, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is almost certainly controlling. On 
the “significant nexus” requirement, see, for example, FINDING NEMO (Pixar Animation 
Studios 2003), which depicts captive fish in an aquarium, plotting to escape, who observe 
that “[a]ll drains lead to the ocean.” 
128.  Solid Waste Agency did invoke the need to interpret the Corps’ authority narrowly in order to 
avoid constitutional difficulties under the Commerce Clause. 531 U.S. at 172-74. After Raich, 
however, it is hard to believe that the Court would strike down a measure like the Migratory 
Bird Rule. That does not mean Solid Waste Agency was wrong in either its result or its 
reasoning. As I have argued elsewhere, the avoidance canon is a means for enforcing 
otherwise underenforced constitutional norms, even if the relevant doctrine would not void 
the measure in question if the constitutional question were reached and decided. Ernest A. 
Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000). 
129.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). It is thus unsurprising that commentary on Rapanos has 
described its holding in constitutional terms. See, e.g., M. Reed Hopper & Damien M. 
Schiff, Rapanos v. United States, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 64, 67 (“[T]he fundamental 
principle . . . in Rapanos [is] that there are limits to federal power and the means employed 
to achieve national aims.”). 
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delegated authority.130 I do not contend that a statute is as entrenched as a 
constitutional provision. But I do want to insist that the question whether a 
constitutive boundary can be altered by agency action, or only by statutory 
amendment, is the same sort of entrenchment question as whether a boundary 
change requires a formal constitutional amendment. The former question, 
moreover, is far more likely to be a live one under the current constitutional 
law of the regulatory state. 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos resisted deference to the Corps 
and interpreted the CWA’s statutory boundaries as having a relatively fixed 
and autonomous meaning. Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence offered a 
considerably more dynamic reading. For him, the Corps could regulate any 
wetland that possesses “a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were 
navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.”131 The “significant 
nexus” phrase, as Justice Scalia pointed out, appears not in the statute but 
rather in the Court’s opinion in Solid Waste Agency.132 It thus seems fair to 
point out that the disagreement between Justices Scalia and Kennedy over the 
proper interpretive sources and methods under the CWA replicates the debate 
they have had for years over the legitimacy of “common law” or “evolving” 
approaches to constitutional meaning.133 For Justice Kennedy (and for the four 
dissenters in Rapanos), the Clean Water Act is not simply a constitution—it is a 
living one. 
3. The Extracanonical Constitution of War Powers: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld134 may be the most important separation-of-powers 
decision in a generation. But it did not interpret the Constitution—at least not 
the canonical one. The Court characterized the case as “raising important 
 
130.  See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2215 (plurality opinion) (noting “the immense expansion of 
federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any 
change in the governing statute—during the past five Presidential administrations”). 
131.  Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
132.  Id. at 2233-34 (plurality opinion). 
133.  Compare Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (insisting that federal courts 
lack authority to interpret the Constitution in a common law fashion), with Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (opinion by O’Connor, Kennedy, & 
Souter, JJ.) (extolling an evolving, common law approach to constitutional interpretation). 
134.  126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).  
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questions about the balance of powers in our constitutional structure,”135 yet 
the issues actually in play concerned interpretation of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice,136 the Authorization for Use of Military Force approved by 
Congress after the September 11, 2001, attacks,137 the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005,138 and the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.139 As Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence pointed out, “a case that may be of extraordinary 
importance is resolved by ordinary rules . . . pertaining to the authority of 
Congress and the interpretation of its enactments.”140 There is no mistaking, 
however, the constitutive functions served by these materials. 
Since the early Republic, we have had a military justice system operating in 
parallel with the civilian courts established under Article III. The “constitution” 
of that system, in its modern incarnation, is the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ). As Justice Kennedy explained, 
The UCMJ as a whole establishes an intricate system of military justice. 
It authorizes courts-martial in various forms, . . . it regulates the 
organization and procedures of those courts, . . . it defines offenses . . . 
and rights for the accused . . . and it provides mechanisms for appellate 
review. . . . [T]he statute further recognizes that special military 
commissions may be convened to try war crimes. . . . While these laws 
provide authority for certain forms of military courts, they also impose 
limitations . . . .141 
The UCMJ is not, however, the only source of relevant constitutive rules. As 
Justice Kennedy went on to note, “the statute allows the President to 
implement and build on the UCMJ’s framework by adopting procedural 
regulations.”142 Moreover, by explicitly incorporating the “law of war,” 
 
135.  Id. at 2759; see also id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Trial by military 
commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order.”). 
136.  10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). 
137.  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
138.  Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
139.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135. 
140.  126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
141.  Id. at 2800-01. 
142.  Id. at 2801. 
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Congress introduced a third set of constitutive principles derived from both 
international treaties and customary international law.143 
Salim Ahmed Hamdan challenged his impending military trial by resorting 
to another justice system also dominated by statutes. He filed a petition for 
habeas corpus in federal district court—a procedural right guaranteed by the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution,144 but one that is actually created and 
defined by the federal habeas statute.145 Because the jurisdiction of the civilian 
courts is also circumscribed by statute, the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether Congress had foreclosed jurisdiction over Hamdan’s petition in the 
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which created limited and exclusive 
procedures for judicial review of detention of individuals and of commission 
proceedings.146 The majority ultimately concluded that the DTA did not apply 
retroactively to bar Hamdan’s suit, which was filed before the statute’s effective 
date. This was a difficult question of statutory construction, but the point I 
want to focus on is a more basic one. Like virtually every decision that the 
Supreme Court has ever rendered concerning a legislative restriction on federal 
court jurisdiction, Hamdan avoided identifying the constitutional boundary for 
permissible jurisdiction stripping and instead focused on the boundaries of 
judicial power set by Congress in the statute itself.147 Just as the Commerce 
Clause has relatively little relevance to current disputes about the scope of 
national power, so too the Court has labored to keep Article III largely out of 
debates over jurisdiction stripping. 
On the merits, Justice Stevens’s opinion offered two reasons why Hamdan 
could not legally be tried before a military commission. The first, which 
garnered only four votes, was that Congress had authorized military 
 
143.  See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (indicating that military commissions are limited to “offenders 
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions”); 
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (noting that “the law of war 
. . . derives from ‘rules and precepts of the law of nations’; it is the body of international law 
governing armed conflict” (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942))). 
144.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”). 
145.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2000). Mr. Hamdan could file a habeas petition despite being held 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because the Supreme Court had recently determined, as a matter 
of statutory construction, that the writ extended to persons held abroad so long as someone in 
the custodian’s chain of command was within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal district 
court. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
146.  See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739. 
147.  See, e.g., Young, supra note 128, at 1556-68 (chronicling the Court’s use of the avoidance 
canon to avoid deciding what limits, if any, Article III imposes on Congress’s power to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
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commissions only “in circumstances where justified under the ‘Constitution 
and laws,’ including the law of war.”148 Hamdan’s prosecution did not meet 
this standard because the crime of conspiracy—the only offense charged 
against Hamdan—was not recognized under the common law of war.149 The 
second argument, which did get a majority, concerned the procedures by which 
Hamdan was to be tried. According to the Court, “[t]he UCMJ conditions the 
President’s use of military commissions on compliance not only with the 
American common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself . . . and 
with the ‘rules and precepts of the law of nations’ . . . .”150 The Court read 
article 36 of the UCMJ to require parity between military commission and 
courts-martial procedures in the absence of special justification, which the 
President had not provided.151 The majority also objected to particular aspects 
of commission procedure on the ground that they conflicted with Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which the UCMJ incorporates as part of 
“the law of war.”152 
Both of Justice Stevens’s arguments were, at bottom, statutory. Both the 
common law of war and the Geneva Convention bind the executive because 
Congress has incorporated them by reference in the UCMJ. As Justice Breyer 
made clear, “[t]he Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: 
Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”153 
Equally striking, given Hamdan’s central concern with matters of criminal 
procedure, is the absence of any constitutional due process argument.154 Two 
years earlier, in Hamdi, the Court held that due process limits executive 
 
148.  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 (plurality opinion). See generally Uniform Code of Military 
Justice art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (“The provisions of this chapter conferring 
jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that 
by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals.”). 
149.  See 126 S. Ct. at 2775-86 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy—the fifth vote—did not reach 
this ground of decision. See id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
150.  Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)). 
151.  Id. at 2788-93; see Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000) (“All 
rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable.”). 
152.  126 S. Ct. at 2797-98 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy did not join Part VI-D-iv of the 
Court’s Geneva Convention discussion, concerning the right to be present at trial. See id. at 
2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
153.  126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part) (“[D]omestic statutes control this case. If Congress . . . deems it appropriate to change 
the controlling statutes . . . it has the power and prerogative to do so.”). 
154.  To the extent that such claims may have been urged on the Court, they do not show up in 
the opinions. 
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detention of suspected enemy combatants.155 In Hamdan, however, both the 
obligation of procedural fairness and its benchmark standard—the procedures 
used in ordinary courts-martial—come from the UCMJ and its incorporation 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.156 Going forward, one can 
reasonably predict that statutory benchmarks (now embodied in the relatively 
robust procedural provisions of the Military Commissions Act157) will have 
considerably greater bite than the constitutional one under the Due Process 
Clause. Hamdi, after all, framed the requirements of due process in this context 
in exceptionally deferential terms.158 
To the extent that anyone relied on the canonical Constitution in Hamdan, 
it was the President. Proponents of broad executive authority have viewed 
Article II as a virtually “complete” grant of executive authority.159 For Justice 
Scalia, Article II’s statement that “‘[t]he executive power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States’ . . . does not mean some of the executive power, 
but all of the executive power.”160 Hence, the grant of “executive power,” 
without more, confers upon the President the authority to detain, to establish 
military commissions, and to take all manner of other actions pursuant to the 
war on terror. Executive power advocates have also frequently argued that the 
exercise of such power cannot be regulated by Congress.161 On this view, 
 
155.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
156.  See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. It seems unlikely that this difference arises from the fact that 
Hamdan, unlike Hamdi, was not a citizen. The Due Process Clause confers rights on “any 
person,” not citizens only, and the Hamdi plurality seemed to assume that the rights it 
considered were applicable to noncitizens. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525 (noting that the habeas 
corpus vehicle for reviewing due process claims “remains available to every individual 
detained within the United States” (emphasis added)). 
157.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 948q-s, 949a-o, 950a-j, 2006 
U.S.S.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 2600. 
158.  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (noting that while suspected enemy combatants must be afforded 
basic elements of due process, “exigencies of the circumstances may demand that . . . 
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive 
at a time of ongoing military conflict”). 
159.  See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). The “virtually” in the text arises from the unitary theorists’ 
concession that some aspects of traditionally “executive” authority, such as the power to 
declare war, are explicitly delegated to Congress in Article I. See id. at 253. 
160.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1). 
161.  See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 2 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf 
(arguing that Congress’s attempt to regulate treatment of enemy combatants “would 
represent an unconstitutional infringement of the President’s authority to conduct war”). 
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Article II completely constitutes the executive power in a variety of contexts, 
including war powers. 
The Hamdan majority, to the contrary, insisted that the sorts of war powers 
at issue in cases like Hamdan—powers outside the operational control of the 
military forces such as the power to detain, interrogate, and try prisoners for 
war crimes—are creatures of the extracanonical constitution. They are, in other 
words, governed by the web of statutory provisions authorizing and limiting 
executive action in the area of military force. The point is not that the 
extracanonical constitution trumps the canonical one, but rather that the latter 
is incomplete. While Article II vests the President with executive power, it 
remains for Congress to “constitute” that power by devising the institutional 
structures and procedures through which it may be exercised. As Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence pointed out, the Constitution leaves open the “ability to 
determine—through democratic means—how best to [deal with danger].”162 
This central role for legislation reflects the emphasis on congressional 
action in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,163 the dominant precedent on 
presidential powers and foreign affairs law. Justice Black’s majority opinion in 
Youngstown focused on the canonical Constitution, construing the 
Commander-in-Chief and “Take Care” Clauses, which President Truman 
invoked to justify his seizure of the steel mills.164 The concurring analyses of 
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, however, have been far more influential in 
subsequent cases. Both of these opinions viewed the extent of executive 
authority as a function of Congress’s own action. Justice Jackson explained: 
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate. . . . When the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he 
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain. . . . [W]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power 
is at its lowest ebb . . . .165 
 
162.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2649, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
163.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
164.  Id. at 587-88. 
165.  Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring). A majority of the Court adopted Justice Jackson’s 
approach in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981). The Court recognized, 
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Justice Kennedy’s critical concurrence in Hamdan invoked Justice Jackson at 
length.166 And the majority cited Jackson for the proposition, which Justice 
Stevens took as settled, that “[w]hether or not the President has independent 
power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, 
he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in the proper exercise of its 
own war powers, placed on his powers.”167 
Youngstown’s methodological divide between Justice Black and Justices 
Jackson and Frankfurter is often described as a contrast between formalism and 
functionalism.168 That is true, but the divergence is not just that. It is also a 
contrast between exclusive reliance on the canonical Constitution and broader 
attention to other constitutive sources.169 Because Justices Jackson and 
Frankfurter have proven more influential than Justice Black in this area, 
Youngstown now stands for the proposition that Congress has broad authority 
to structure the exercise of executive authority. Especially in foreign affairs law, 
the boundary between presidential and congressional authority will almost 
always be drawn through legislation. As Justice Kennedy pointed out, Hamdan 
rests on “the constitutional principle that congressional statutes can be 
controlling.”170 
C. Extracanonical Functions 
By focusing on three cases from the 2005 Term, I do not mean to suggest 
that the extracanonical constitution is a new development. The original 
 
however, that “it is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, 
not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running 
from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.” Id. at 669. 
166.  See 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“The proper framework for 
assessing whether Executive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice 
Jackson in his opinion in [Youngstown].”). 
167.  Id. at 2774 n.23 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens also noted that “[t]he Government does 
not argue otherwise.” Id. 
168.  See, e.g., Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1522-
31 & nn.55 & 59 (1991). 
169.  One can imagine, for example, a Jacksonian emphasis on the existence or absence of 
statutory authorization that was nonetheless highly formal in the way it construed the 
statutes. One can likewise imagine an opinion following Black by ignoring 
extraconstitutional norms, but that framed the constitutional issue in functionalist terms of 
“balance” among the branches. These two ways of looking at Youngstown could be 
reconciled, I suppose, by observing that the whole notion of an extracanonical constitution 
rests on adopting a functional test, rather than a formal one, for what counts as “the 
Constitution” in the first place. 
170.  126 S. Ct. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
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Constitution, for example, explicitly delegated to Congress the option and 
responsibility for establishing the lower federal courts, allocating their 
jurisdiction, and articulating their procedures.171 Likewise, the Bill of Rights 
looked to external sources to draw the line between civil cases that must be 
tried to a jury and those triable by the court172 and—arguably—to identify 
rights “retained by the people.”173 While extracanonical institutions like the 
administrative state play a much greater role today than they did in the early 
nineteenth century, it also seems likely that some forms of extracanonical 
rights—for example, rights grounded in natural law—may have enjoyed a 
greater prominence early on than they do today.174 The Constitution has 
always been an incomplete description of our constitutive legal commitments, 
although the role and salience of the extracanonical constitution has changed 
over the course of our history. 
This Section briefly introduces some of the different roles that 
extracanonical norms play in the constitutional order. While I hesitate to 
proclaim the list exhaustive, I focus here on five distinct functions: 
implementation, specification, supplementation, supersession, and 
entrenchment. The boundaries between these categories are fuzzy and 
contestable. Whether you think Griswold v. Connecticut’s recognition of a right 
to privacy175 is an example of specification (describing how textual principles 
under the Due Process Clause bear on certain situations) or supplementation 
(reading in an evolving norm of privacy in response to the intrusions of 
 
171.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain 
and establish.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28 (5th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (“The judiciary article of the Constitution was not self-
executing, and the first Congress therefore faced the task of structuring a court system and, 
within limits established by the Constitution, of defining its jurisdiction.”). 
172.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (observing that the right to 
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment turns on whether a particular claim is more 
analogous to “suits brought in the English law courts” or to “18th-century cases tried in 
courts of equity or admiralty”). 
173.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
174.  See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135, 139 (1810) (suggesting that a Georgia 
statute could be struck down under either the Contract Clause or “by general principles 
which are common to our free institutions”); ELY, supra note 60, at 48-50 (observing that 
while natural law played a role in the Constitution’s early period, the idea now “is a 
discredited one”). 
175.  381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). 
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modern society) will depend on how you read the Due Process Clause, and 
reasonable people will disagree. The important point, however, is to show that 
extracanonical norms play all of these roles—not to determine with precision 
which role is being played in any given case. 
Implementation: The canonical Constitution is not self-sufficient. It sets out 
the skeleton of a government, but it does not describe institutions with the 
completeness necessary for them to actually function. In some areas, the 
canonical document explicitly recognizes the need for implementation and 
delegates authority for that purpose: Articles I and III delegate authority to 
establish a federal judicial system,176 and Article IV delegates authority to create 
a government in the territories.177 Textual delegations of substantive 
lawmaking authority likewise have been understood to include authority to 
create institutions, such as the Bank of the United States178 or the federal 
bankruptcy courts.179 Similarly, the Reconstruction Amendments empower 
Congress to “enforce” substantive entitlements to equal protection, due 
process, and equal voting rights through “appropriate legislation.”180 Congress 
has used this authority not only to create federal institutional arrangements, 
such as the federal remedial structure that grew up under the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871,181 but also to regulate and reshape institutional structures at the state 
and local level through legislation like the Voting Rights Act.182 
Other constitutive rules operate at a more basic level. The Constitution 
calls for a bicameral legislative body, but each house of Congress has had to 
develop a more detailed set of rules for its processes of deliberation and 
voting.183 John Marshall derived the power of judicial review from the nature of 
the judicial function in a legal system with a written constitution,184 but both 
Congress and the federal courts have had to develop an extraordinarily 
complex system of constitutional remedies in order to implement that 
 
176.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III. 
177.  Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have power to . . . make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory . . . belonging to the United States.”). 
178.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
179.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (2000). 
180.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. 
181.  42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2000). 
182.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2000) (amended 2006). 
183.  See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 109-157 (2007); S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF 
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15 (2000). 
184.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).  
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mandate.185 Our system of constitutional law would be unrecognizable without 
these constitutive, but extracanonical, rules. 
Specification: Extracanonical materials often support canonical norms by 
particularizing them in order to aid their application in specific situations.186 
Judge-made doctrinal “tests” are necessary to implement canonical commands 
like the Equal Protection Clause,187 and statutory and regulatory materials will 
sometimes serve a similar purpose.188 Section 2 of the War Powers Resolution, 
for example, specifies Congress’s interpretation of constitutional war powers, 
and the remaining sections set out a process for how that interpretation should 
apply in particular circumstances.189 Sometimes, different branches of the 
government will disagree about the specific meaning of a given canonical 
provision. While its attempts to specify canonical meaning sometimes fail, 
Congress will often be able to make its interpretation stick—particularly if its 
power to act is not dependent on the presence of a violation of constitutional 
norms.190 
Supplementation: “Supplementation” occurs at a further remove from the 
commands of the canonical Constitution. The Constitution is arguably silent, 
 
185.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
186.  See Perry, supra note 24, at 113 (“The process of ‘specifying,’ in a particular context, a norm 
implicated but also indeterminate in the context is the process of deciding what the norm, in 
conjunction with all the other relevant considerations, should be construed to require in that 
context.”). 
187.  See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (discussing 
the role of constitutional doctrine). I have not taken a firm position on whether 
constitutional doctrine should be viewed as extracanonical in nature. If we view all such 
doctrine as extracanonical, then there is precious little left of the canonical Constitution; 
very few of its provisions, after all, are self-applying. On the other hand, much doctrine 
exists at a significant remove from the text—for example, the right to privacy and the 
anticommandeering doctrine—and might be better viewed as extracanonical. For one thing, 
judicial doctrine is not entrenched in the same way as the canonical text itself, because the 
Supreme Court, at least, can overrule its doctrinal precedents without going through the 
Article V process. 
188.  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 (1993) 
(discussing the use of statutes to specify the meaning of constitutional commitments). 
189.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000).  
190.  Compare, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act as applied to state and local governments, on the ground that 
Congress’s extension of free exercise rights exceeded its power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to “enforce” the religion clauses), with Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (acknowledging RFRA’s 
validity as applied to federal entities, in light of Congress’s plenary power to regulate the 
operations of the federal government). 
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for example, on the issue of administrative government; it nowhere explicitly 
authorizes the creation of vast administrative bureaucracies to supplement the 
three branches—legislative, executive, judicial—described in the canonical 
document.191 But neither does it forbid the creation of additional governmental 
institutions, and throughout our history the “constitutional” branches have 
spawned additional institutions to fulfill a wide variety of purposes. Likewise, 
rights-creating statutes give rise to additional entitlements—for example, 
protection from discrimination on the basis of disability or minimal financial 
security in old age192—not readily derived from the canonical document. It 
should be obvious that this sort of extracanonical supplementation is a primary 
means by which a Constitution that is very old and hard to amend manages to 
serve the needs of a modern and highly complex society. Any number of 
observers have pointed to the common law approach that the federal courts 
have taken to constitutional interpretation as a crucial means of constitutional 
adaptation,193 but it would be a mistake to overemphasize the judicial role at 
the expense of the extracanonical constitution “outside the courts.” 
Supersession: Supplementation operates where the Constitution is silent, 
but “supersession” may involve breaking constitutional rules. More precisely, 
“supersession” involves the replacement of “obsolete” structures or principles 
in the canonical document with analogous but different extracanonical rules. 
For example, Congress’s ability to shift lawmaking responsibility to the 
executive branch was once limited by the nondelegation doctrine, which 
permitted shifting implementation functions to agencies but insisted that 
Congress make the basic policy decisions by articulating an “intelligible 
principle” to guide agency discretion.194 But the courts found the concept of 
excessive delegation very difficult to define and police, and they eventually gave 
up trying.195 Still, the result has not been unlimited discretion for agencies. 
 
191.  At best, these bureaucracies are a “necessary and proper” means to implement Congress’s 
enumerated authority to regulate interstate commerce and other subjects substantively. U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. But even if we treat the Constitution as not entirely silent on the 
validity of the administrative state, it should be obvious that statutes, not the canonical 
Constitution, do the constitutive heavy lifting in establishing it. 
192.  See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000); Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (2000). 
193.  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
905-06 (1996). 
194.  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1928). 
195.  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Richard B. Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1697 (1975) (“Given such 
subjective standards, and the controversial character of decisions on whether to invalidate 
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Instead, the delegation boundary, derived from the canonical Vesting Clause of 
Article I, has been replaced with a variety of extracanonical limits on agency 
discretion. Chief among these has been judicial review of agency action, 
generally conducted pursuant to the APA, for conformity to whatever 
guidelines Congress has set forth in the statute.196 The boundaries of agency 
discretion thus now reside in the delegating statutes themselves, rather than in 
doctrine derived from the canonical Constitution. In this sense, APA review has 
superseded the old constitutional limit. 
The idea that entrenched canonical principles can be abandoned and 
replaced with something else raises troubling questions of legitimacy, and I 
have sought to explore some of those questions elsewhere.197 Not all instances 
of supersession require transgression of canonical boundaries, however. In 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,198 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted federal 
question jurisdiction under Article III extremely broadly, so as to cover any suit 
with a federal ingredient, even if that ingredient is not contested.199 Osborn’s 
breadth means that Article III itself rarely constrains the scope of federal 
question jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction requires both a constitutional and a 
statutory basis, however, and parallel “arising under” language in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 has been interpreted more narrowly. Most importantly, it excludes cases 
in which the federal question appears as a defense, rather than on the face of a 
well-pleaded complaint.200 Section 1331 has thus become the primary limiting 
factor on federal question jurisdiction, replacing Article III’s canonical 
boundary; most jurisdictional debates therefore focus on the relevant statutes 
and ignore the constitutional standard.201 The effect of this arrangement is to 
 
legislative delegations, such decisions will almost inevitably appear partisan, and might 
often be so.”). 
196.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 143 (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory 
agencies, questionable in light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the 
Constitution, have been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to 
ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives have been issued.”). 
197.  See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and 
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005); see also Lawson, supra note 
81. 
198.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, the federal element was simply the corporate 
status of the Bank (a creature of federal law) and its concomitant right to sue and be sued. 
199.  See id. at 823. But cf. A.J. Bellia, The Origins of Article III ‘Arising Under’ Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (offering a somewhat narrower view of Osborn).  
200.  See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See generally HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 171, at 832 (“[I]t is well-established that the constitutional language 
reaches more broadly than does the language of § 1331.”). 
201.  See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson ex rel. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
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give Congress flexibility to expand the federal question beyond the basic § 1331 
boundary in particular areas,202 without committing to the universal extension 
that would be mandated were the statutory and constitutional boundaries to be 
interpreted as coextensive. 
Entrenchment: Canonical norms are defined by a particular kind of 
entrenchment: they (generally) may be modified only by an Article V 
amendment. But as Gonzales, Rapanos, and Hamdan all illustrate, legal norms 
can enjoy several different degrees of relative entrenchment. One of the key 
functions of the extracanonical constitution is to differentiate among those 
various degrees of entrenchment that fall short of formal constitutional status. 
I focus on the complex relationship between the extracanonical constitution’s 
constitutive and entrenchment functions in the next Part. 
ii. entrenchment and constitutional change 
A functional look at the U.S. “Constitution” reveals a far broader range of 
“constitutive” legal materials than the Philadelphia document and its 
amendments. To the extent that this observation is surprising, it is because our 
definition of “constitutional law” remains tightly bound to just one of the 
many functions that constitutions perform. The point is not simply that most 
Americans outside legal academia view “the Constitution” as a formally 
entrenched document. What is more striking is that scholars who accept that 
the Constitution may change outside the formal Article V process nonetheless 
insist on entrenchment as the sine qua non of constitutionalism. My central 
objective here, by contrast, is to decouple constitutional definition from the 
entrenchment function. The remainder of this Article explores how recognizing 
the constitutive functions of ordinary law might matter for debates about 
constitutional theory, doctrine, pedagogy, and scholarship. 
A. The Rule of Recognition Problem 
There is nothing new about identifying constitutional norms outside the 
canonical text. Karl Llewellyn observed in 1934 that “most of the going 
framework of our Leviathan is hardly adumbrated in the Document. As a 
criterion of what our working Constitution is, the language fails in both 
directions. It affords neither a positive nor a negative test.”203 Llewellyn’s foray 
 
202.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2000) (allowing federal officers to remove a case to federal court 
based on a federal defense). 
203.  Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 15. 
0408_YOUNG_0473.DOC 12/14/2007  1:07:31 PM 
the constitution outside the constitution 
449 
 
into public law is largely forgotten today, but our constitutional debates remain 
dominated by the issue of extratextual principles. The longstanding argument 
over “living constitution” theories of unenumerated individual rights,204 the 
Yale school’s assertion that the Constitution may be amended outside the 
Article V process,205 and John Ferejohn and William Eskridge’s theory of 
“super-statutes” that attain quasi-constitutional status206—all of these raise 
questions of extracanonical norms. 
All of these invocations of extracanonical norms share a further 
characteristic, however, that sets them apart from the position that I defend 
here. The extracanonical norms identified by Llewellyn, Ackerman, Eskridge, 
and Ferejohn all enjoy a constitutional status that sets them apart from ordinary 
legislation. Professor Ackerman’s “dualist” theory distinguishes sharply 
between norms that arise out of “normal politics” and those that are the 
product of “higher lawmaking.”207 Professor Llewellyn insisted that “a 
constitution is not the governmental machine at large, but rather its 
fundamental framework,” thus accepting the necessity of “marking off how 
much and which portions are to be regarded as basic to the whole, and 
therefore, as the working Constitution.”208 And while Professors Eskridge and 
Ferejohn recognize that “[t]he traditional distinction between ordinary law and 
higher lawmaking is not sufficiently fine-grained for the modern state,” they 
view “super-statutes” as occupying a distinct, “intermediate category of 
fundamental or quasi-constitutional law.”209  
Each of these theorists identifies constitutional status with some form of 
entrenchment. One of the central criteria for inclusion in Professor Llewellyn’s 
“working Constitution” was that the relevant political actors “must feel that the 
 
204.  Compare, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 76 (2004) (arguing that judges should serve as equal “partners” 
to the Framers of the Constitution and act creatively to “bring[] our political community 
better into conformity with fundamental requirements of political justice”), with William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976) (having no truck 
with such a notion).  
205.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: 
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
206.  See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 19. 
207.  See infra text accompanying note 218.  
208.  Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 26 (citations omitted). Matthew Palmer, who closely follows 
Llewellyn, likewise seems to want to ascribe special status to his “complete constitution” 
defined by realist emphasis on the actual performance of constitutional functions. See 
Palmer, supra note 5, at 634-35. 
209.  Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 19, at 1275 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1266 (“[W]e 
urge that super-statutes be considered something more than ordinary lawmaking.”). 
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way or institution is not subject to abrogation or material alteration.”210 
Professor Ackerman is not as clear as he might be on the extent to which the 
products of “higher lawmaking” are entrenched against subsequent change. 
His examples concern the empowerment of government (at least at the federal 
level), so that the constitutional revolution is achieved when statutes that 
would once have been held to extend beyond the limits of governmental power 
under the old Constitution are now upheld by the courts.211 Such decisions, for 
Ackerman, amount to “translating constitutional politics into constitutional 
law, supplying the cogent doctrinal principles that will guide normal politics 
for many years to come.”212 When past law shapes future law in this way, 
rather than being reshaped by it, that is the essence of entrenchment. 
Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn’s super-statutes play a similar role. They 
thus assert that “the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] is a proven super-statute 
because it embodies a great principle (antidiscrimination), was adopted after 
an intense political struggle and normative debate and has over the years 
entrenched its norm into American public life, and has pervasively affected 
federal statutes and constitutional law.”213 
Conferring constitutional status on norms that have not been formally 
adopted as part of the canonical document creates not only problems of 
legitimacy, but also difficult problems of definition. Much turns on a norm’s 
being “in” or “out” of an expanded constitution, and consequently pressure 
builds to define the boundaries of the extracanonical constitution with a high 
degree of precision. Each theory must, in other words, develop a rule of 
constitutional recognition to replace Article V’s test of canonical adoption.214 
Unfortunately, this is where extracanonical theories tend to fall down. 
Karl Llewellyn’s rule of constitutional recognition mirrored the positivist 
account of rules of recognition generally: the “working Constitution” is those 
institutions and practices that the relevant class of officials tend to treat as “not 
subject to abrogation or material alteration.”215 Professor Llewellyn was more 
 
210.  Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 29. 
211.  ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19, at 268 (“[T]he Justices proceed to the codification 
stage by issuing a set of transformative opinions validating the second wave of statutes 
despite their inconsistency with bedrock legal principles that were foundational during the 
previous regime.”). 
212.  Id. at 267. 
213.  Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 19, at 1237 (citations omitted). 
214.  I use “rule of recognition” here in a narrower and less fundamental sense than the positivist 
criterion discussed earlier. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
215.  Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 29. 
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concerned with debunking formal tests than providing abstract criteria for 
evaluation. “[I]t is not essential,” he insisted,  
that the practice or institution shall be in any way related to the 
Document; nor that it be old, if it in any other manner acquire the look 
and sense of future permanence; nor that the machinery of change be 
complex or cumbersome, if the likelihood of change approaches zero.216  
The edges of Llewellyn’s working Constitution are thus “not sharp, but 
penumbra-like. And the penumbra will of necessity be in constant flux.”217 The 
only reason that Llewellyn’s self-styled “sane theory” of constitutionalism can 
tolerate such an amorphous boundary is, as I shall discuss, that less turns on 
the boundary than Llewellyn seems to think. 
For Bruce Ackerman, by contrast, a great deal turns on the boundary 
problem. “Above all else,” he says, his theory “seeks to distinguish between two 
different decisions that may be made in a democracy. The first is a decision by 
the American people; the second, by their government.”218 The importance of 
this distinction is evident in the title he gives to his theory: “Dualist 
Democracy.” He explains: 
Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional 
conditions. Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the 
name of the People, a movement’s political partisans must, first, 
convince an extraordinary number of their fellow citizens to take their 
proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord 
to politics; second, they must allow their opponents a fair opportunity 
to organize their own forces; third, they must convince a majority of 
their fellow Americans to support their initiative as its merits are 
discussed, time and again, in the deliberative fora provided for “higher 
lawmaking.”219 
Professor Ackerman’s rule of recognition takes the form of a higher 
lawmaking “obstacle course”220 which Ackerman’s later work elaborates as a 
five-step process: 
 
216.  Id. at 30. 
217.  Id. at 26. 
218.  ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19, at 6. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. 
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Constitutional Impasse ? Electoral Mandate ? Challenge to 
Dissenting Institutions ? Switch in Time ? Consolidating Election221 
Extracanonical norms that survive this gauntlet are entrenched against 
alteration by way of ordinary politics: 
Even when this system of “normal lawmaking” is operating well, . . . 
the dualist Constitution prevents elected politicians from exaggerating 
their authority. They are not to assert that a normal electoral victory has 
given them a mandate to enact an ordinary statute that overturns the 
considered judgments previously reached by the People.222 
The problem, of course, is that notwithstanding the elaborate mechanisms 
of Ackermanian “moments,” it is very difficult to identify with precision when 
one has actually occurred.223 Likewise, Ackerman’s recognition criteria for a 
“constitutional moment” do relatively little to pin down the precise content of 
the now-entrenched norms. As my colleague Scot Powe has pointed out, “the 
New Deal left no text. How are courts or ‘We the people’ to interpret the New 
Deal ‘amendments’?”224 
Similar problems bedevil William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of 
“super-statutes.” Although they share my own wish to “break down this 
dichotomy” between “the ‘higher lawmaking’ entailed in the Constitution and 
‘ordinary lawmaking’ entailed in statutes,”225 Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn 
nonetheless accord special status to “super” laws. Such statutes should be 
construed liberally and purposively;226 courts may apply them more 
confidently without deferring to other actors, such as administrative 
agencies;227 and super-statutes need not always (or even often) bow to 
 
221.  ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 56, at 20. 
222.  ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19, at 6. 
223.  See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 918 (1992) 
(reviewing ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 19) (concluding that “the book . . . 
provides inadequate criteria to identify the moments in the past that have special 
constitutional importance”). Although Professor Ackerman’s second book provided 
somewhat more specific criteria, the indeterminacy criticism has persisted. See infra note 224 
and accompanying text. 
224.  L.A. Powe, Jr., Ackermania or Uncomfortable Truths?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 547, 566 (1998) 
(reviewing ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 56). 
225.  Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 19, at 1266. 
226.  See id. at 1247. 
227.  See id. at 1252. Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn do not rule out deference to agency 
interpretations altogether, but would impose important limits on such deference stemming 
from the underlying enactment’s “super” status. 
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substantive canons of statutory construction and “clear-statement” rules.228 
More broadly, Eskridge and Ferejohn suggest that courts should look to the 
norms embodied in super-statutes when construing other laws—and perhaps 
even when construing the Constitution itself.229 It thus becomes critical to 
identify the “super” category with precision: 
A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new 
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time 
does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the super-statute and its 
institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the law . . . . 
Super-statutes are typically enacted only after lengthy normative debate 
about a vexing social or economic problem . . . . The law must also 
prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time, such that 
its earlier critics are discredited and its policy and principles become 
axiomatic for the public culture.230 
Unfortunately, each of these criteria is likely to prove subjective and 
indeterminate. How important does the statute’s public purpose have to be? 
How much deliberation has to go into its enactment? How much subsequent 
testing and elaboration by courts, agencies, and amending Congresses? How 
much additional law has to be generated and shaped by a statute before it 
becomes “super”? Eskridge and Ferejohn consider, for example, the possibility 
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 is a super-
statute.231 But they conclude that it is not, based on the fact that no Supreme 
Court Justice has “characterized the FCLAA in such glowing terms,” and on the 
professors’ judgment that “its regulatory regime emerges in retrospect as a 
cowardly one.”232 These criteria are so wildly subjective that there must be 
something more operating under the hood of the theory. But no more rigorous 
criteria are offered. 
 
228.  See id. at 1253, 1267. 
229.  See id. at 1235-36. 
230.  Id. at 1216. As examples, Eskridge and Ferejohn focus on the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2000); and 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). See Eskridge & 
Ferejohn, supra note 19, at 1231-46. They acknowledge that the Endangered Species Act’s 
“super” status remains somewhat in doubt. See id. at 1245-46. 
231.  Id. at 1259 (“It bears at least some of the indicia, for it embodies a robust principle, that 
consumers should know the health risks of tobacco products and the government ought to 
compel the producers . . . to inform them; its policy has been the basis for subsequent 
federal and some state laws.”). 
232.  Id. at 1260. 
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The boundary problems that I have just described cannot be fixed by 
coming up with a more creative or sophisticated theory. Whenever one confers 
constitutional status on a norm that does not meet the document’s formal 
criteria, similar dilemmas are certain to arise. It may be that our constitutional 
system cannot entirely avoid conferring such status on extracanonical norms. I 
have argued elsewhere, for example, that evolving traditions should have force 
in constitutional interpretation,233 and the identification and interpretation of 
those traditions pose “rule of recognition” problems that are no different in 
kind (although hopefully lesser in degree) than those I have attributed to 
Llewellyn, Ackerman, Eskridge, and Ferejohn. All the same, I do want to 
suggest that interpreters can minimize the need to draw these difficult 
boundaries by decoupling the constitutional functions of extracanonical norms 
from their entrenched status. 
The category of “constitutive” legal norms, as I have described it in this 
Article, is broad and various, and its boundaries are admittedly fuzzy. Any 
statute or regulation that creates a governmental office—whether that office is 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve or a security guard at a Senate Office 
Building—performs a constitutive function. So does any legal rule that confers 
a right on an individual or a group, and I have already acknowledged that the 
boundary between rights-creation and ordinary substantive regulation is 
ephemeral at best.234 I can offer no precise rule of recognition to separate 
constitutive norms from nonconstitutive ones. But this is only a serious 
problem if something important turns on being able to mark that boundary 
with precision. When I say that constitutional functions are often performed 
by “ordinary” laws, I do not mean to suggest that such laws cease to be 
“ordinary” by virtue of those functions.235 My point is simply to identify the 
constitutive roles that such laws play—and, indeed, to show that the role of 
ordinary law in constitutional ordering is pervasive. I hope to demonstrate in 
 
233.  See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 697-712 (1994). 
234.  For example, does a regulation prohibiting dumping dioxin in the water confer a right to be 
free of dioxin pollution? 
235.  Of the theorists I have discussed, my position here corresponds most closely to Professor 
Llewellyn’s. Llewellyn demonstrated that a range of institutions and practices were 
entrenched in a functional sense—that is, that the relevant political actors accepted them as 
not subject to change under ordinary circumstances. He nonetheless seems to have assumed 
a need for courts to identify which institutions and practices had this status, presumably so 
that the courts could protect that status through judicial review. I never thought that I 
would be one to write that someone like Karl Llewellyn was not realist enough, but surely the 
point of his analysis is that the institutions and practices that make up our “working 
Constitution” do not depend on courts, or upon formal categorization, for their staying 
power. 
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the rest of this Article that this simple observation is fruitful for constitutional 
theory, doctrine, and teaching. 
B. Extracanonical Mechanisms of Constitutional Change 
Decoupling the constitutive and entrenching functions of constitutional 
law helps make sense of our observed processes of constitutional change. 
Critics of canonical written constitutions in the late eighteenth century insisted 
that such constitutions were too rigid to respond to changing circumstances,236 
and their present-day intellectual heirs lament “[t]he functional impossibility 
of amending the [U.S.] Constitution with regard to anything truly 
significant.”237 Notwithstanding the relative stability of the text, however, the 
American constitutional order has displayed anything but stasis over the past 
two centuries. The great puzzle of American constitutionalism, then, is not 
“how can a great nation survive with a rigid, nonadaptive written 
constitution?” It is rather, “how can such dramatic institutional change be 
squared with a commitment to written constitutionalism?” 
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional “dualism” is the most fully 
developed effort to account for changes in both constitutional structure and 
individual rights that occur through means other than Article V amendment. 
As I have already discussed, Professor Ackerman’s theory famously asserts that 
the Constitution may be amended by popular mobilization that occurs outside 
the Article V process, and it posits an intricate political process for proposing, 
deliberating on, and ratifying these extracanonical amendments.238 Many 
scholars have criticized Ackerman’s view,239 and for the most part I will not 
repeat their arguments here, even though I share their skepticism. Dualism 
does have a great virtue, however. Our constitutional order has plainly changed 
between 1789 and now, and those changes sweep much further than anything 
that shows up in the text adopted through Article V’s formal amendment 
 
236.  See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS (1770), reprinted in 2 
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 241, 277 (Paul Langford ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1981) (rejecting “scheme[s] upon paper” in favor of “a living, acting, effective 
constitution”); JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, ESSAY ON THE GENERATIVE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (1810), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 147, 149, 151 (Jack 
Lively trans., Macmillan Co. 1965) (insisting that “the weakness and fragility of a 
constitution is in direct relationship to the number of written constitutional articles”). 
237.  SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 167 (2006). 
238.  See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text. 
239.  See supra notes 223-224; see also Tribe, supra note 53. 
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process.240 Dualism’s vision of amendment outside Article V offers an account 
of how that change came about; Ackerman offers a theoretical explanation for 
phenomena that we all observe and for which constitutional formalism cannot 
account. 
A more functional approach to constitutionalism, however, offers a 
promising alternative explanation. The Framers of our canonical document 
created a basic skeleton of our institutions, and they entrenched particular 
solutions to a relatively narrow set of questions. For most purposes, however, 
they sought to create a set of political institutions and to empower those 
institutions to deal creatively with ongoing developments. They left room, in 
other words, for most of our constitutive work to be done outside the 
Constitution itself. That, I submit, is why we remain able to work within the 
same set of basic entrenched commitments two hundred-odd years later.241 
Extracanonical change offers a much simpler explanation for observed 
institutional phenomena, without the elaborate (and unlikely) conceptual 
apparatus and chronic indeterminacy of Professor Ackerman’s approach. 
Aside from its simplicity, my account of extracanonical change has two 
primary advantages over dualism. The first is that it allows broader scope for 
incremental change. By reducing the story of constitutional development to a 
few “moments,” Professor Ackerman neglects the extent to which our 
constitutive arrangements have changed through the enactment of ordinary 
legislation. Certainly some of the constitutive statutes I have mentioned can be 
assimilated to Ackermanian moments—the jurisdictional and remedial 
structure of Reconstruction civil rights legislation, for example, or the 
administrative bureaucracies that arose during the New Deal. But what about 
 
240.  See, e.g., Friedman & Smith, supra note 104, at 45; Sanford Levinson, Accounting for 
Constitutional Change (or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? 
(A) <26; (B) 26; (C) > 26; (D) All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 428 (1991) 
(demonstrating that “any answer [to the question in the title] is more sophisticated 
theoretically than ‘(b)’”); Strauss, supra note 193, at 884 (“The Constitution has changed a 
great deal over time, but—to overstate the point only slightly—the written amendments 
have been a sidelight.”). Scholars observed this phenomenon even before 1937. See 
Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 21 (“Surely there are few superstitions with less substance than 
the belief that the sole, or even the chief process of amending our Constitution consists of 
the machinery of Amendment.”). 
241.  Professor Levinson acknowledges the possibility of amendment by “informal methods,” but 
notes the “lack of transparency” of such amendments and doubts that they are available on 
an adequate range of important issues. LEVINSON, supra note 237, at 164. These would be 
telling objections to a theory like Bruce Ackerman’s, which allows such amendments only on 
great occasions and leaves their meaning to be gleaned by courts from vague materials. 
Extracanonical changes, however, have all the transparency built into the ordinary legislative 
process. And, as I showed in Part I, they have occurred on a vast range of critical issues. 
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the Administrative Procedure Act, surely one of our most important 
constitutive statutes, but enacted in 1946, six years after the second of two 
“consolidating elections” in Ackerman’s system?242 Other plainly constitutive 
measures are even harder to fit into one of Ackerman’s moments. What do we 
make of the Federal Reserve, established in 1913? Or the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1970? Or the long, slow evolution of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, over the course of two centuries, from military 
bridge builders to one of the world’s more powerful regulatory bureaucracies? 
As Barry Friedman and Scott Smith have noted, “history does not move 
exclusively in the earth-shaking jolts and volcanic eruptions of Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments.”243 
The second advantage stems from the rule of recognition problem that I 
discussed in the preceding Section. Dualism has always been dogged by the 
difficulty of identifying the precise content of its informal amendments. One 
might try to include the APA as part of the New Deal “moment,” for example, 
by classifying it as a consequence of that moment’s basic constitutive changes, 
broadly defined. Professor Ackerman, after all, at one point defines the “plain 
meaning” of that moment as this: “We the People had endorsed the New Deal 
vision of activist government.”244 That meaning is so general, however, that it 
can hardly be “plain.” Any action is now within the national government’s 
power as long as it is “activist”? By denying any imperative to treat all 
constitutive changes as entrenched, however, a functionalist account allows 
interpreters to take those changes at face value. That is, each constitutive 
enactment changes the legal order to precisely the extent of that enactment’s 
terms. We need not try to extrapolate a sense of the zeitgeist from the themes 
and proposals of political movements. Rather, changes to the Constitution 
grounded in ordinary law may be interpreted in the ordinary way. 
To be sure, I have already acknowledged that sometimes the extracanonical 
constitution supersedes the canonical one—as, for example, when statutory 
boundaries on national power came to take precedence over narrower, 
traditional conceptions of the commerce power.245 Professor Ackerman would 
have an answer for this: the canonical Constitution has been amended. My 
story has to be more complicated. To a greater extent than we often 
 
242.  See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 56, at 359 (identifying the elections of 1938 
and 1940 as “consolidating elections” that ratified the constitutional changes of the New 
Deal). 
243.  Friedman & Smith, supra note 104, at 30. 
244.  ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 56, at 359. 
245.  See supra notes 92-93, 128-129 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 194-196 and 
accompanying text (discussing supersession). 
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acknowledge, the canonical text is open to some of these dramatic changes. The 
problem with modern federalism jurisprudence, for example, is not that 
“commerce” will not bear the broad meaning attached to it but rather that we 
have failed to find other doctrinal avenues to preserve the Founders’ basic 
principle of balance between national and state power.246 Other instances 
where constitutive enactments have carried us beyond boundaries set by the 
canonical text may have to be written off as mistakes, but then I suspect 
Ackerman likewise would not wish to characterize every successful government 
action contravening constitutional norms as a proper “amendment.” 
More fundamentally, I do not claim my account here to be a complete 
refutation of Professor Ackerman’s dualism. The accounts are not mutually 
exclusive: to note that the extracanonical constitution is frequently amended is 
not to deny that amendments to the canonical text also occur, or even 
necessarily to reject the possibility that such amendments could occur, under 
extraordinary circumstances, outside Article V. Whether or not we consider the 
legal victories of certain social movements to become part of the formal 
Constitution, moreover, the difficult road traversed by such measures may well 
contribute to their functional or sociological entrenchment against subsequent 
change.247 What I do deny is dualism’s premise that “ordinary” law cannot play 
a fundamental constitutive role. Moreover, much of the appeal of Ackerman’s 
framework stems from its ability to explain the phenomenon of constitutional 
change in the absence of formal amendment. If a simpler explanation is 
available, then much of his conceptual apparatus becomes a candidate for 
Occam’s Razor. 
At the end of the day, an account of changes to our constitutive 
arrangements that occur through ordinary politics is more satisfactory than 
resort to Ackerman’s elaborate machinery of “higher lawmaking.” My 
argument here accepts that the constitution has changed, but not because the 
canonical Constitution has been amended in some mysterious non-Article V 
way. Rather, it has changed because most of the Constitution—that is, the 
 
246.  See generally Young, supra note 197, at 1775-99 (arguing that judges should be willing to 
make new doctrine to enforce this principle).  
247.  This is surely true of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6. 
(2000) (amended 2006), for example. But it would be a mistake to think that this is the only 
way ordinary laws may become entrenched. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 
(2000) (originally enacted 1793), may be hard to change simply because it is so old; the 
construction of the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute in Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 
(20 Wall.) 590 (1875), on the other hand, is shielded by the centrality of its role in setting 
state law apart from federal law. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of 
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 921 (1986). It is hard to characterize either law 
as the product of a social movement like the one that produced the Voting Rights Act. 
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constitutive rules that make up our polity—never required an Article V 
amendment to be altered in the first place. The overwhelming majority of 
changes in our constitutional structure since the Founding have resulted from 
changes and additions to the extracanonical norms by which we implement, 
specify, and supplement the canonical document. 
C. Relative Entrenchment 
Moving beyond dualism allows us to recognize that entrenchment is a 
multifarious phenomenon in American law. This is true both formally and 
functionally. Formally speaking, our legal system recognizes multiple degrees 
of entrenchment: as the October Term 2005 cases discussed in Part I illustrate, 
much contemporary legal debate focuses on when a set of rules can be changed 
by unilateral executive action and when the change must be accomplished by 
statutory amendment. Within the sphere of executive action, legislative rules 
are more entrenched than interpretive rules, and more informal forms of 
agency action—such as letter rulings on issues proffered by individuals—are 
less entrenched still. Many critical rules and practices, moreover, are left to 
state law or quasi-governmental institutions, such as political parties. 
Judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution offer another example of 
intermediate entrenchment. Technically, such decisions are just as entrenched 
vis-à-vis other political actors as the canonical Constitution itself. Practically, 
however, Congress can sometimes overcome an adverse judicial decision by 
exercising its factfinding powers,248 and the President and Senate working 
together can appoint new Justices who may one day vote to overrule the 
adverse precedent.249 From the perspective of the Supreme Court itself, 
moreover, prior interpretations are entrenched only to the extent mandated by 
 
248.  See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 320,904, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(1) (2000) (adding factual findings concerning the impact of guns in schools on 
interstate commerce in an effort to overcome the Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), which held that banning guns in schools fell outside Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-56 (1966) 
(accepting Congress’s determination that literacy tests for voting may amount to purposeful 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, notwithstanding a prior contrary 
holding in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1969)). I do not, 
of course, take any position on whether the cited amendment to the Gun Free School Zones 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000), would be sufficient to change the result in Lopez, should the 
Court consider the issue in a subsequent case.  
249.  Cf. Abraham Lincoln, Speech During the Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial Campaign (Oct. 13, 
1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) 
(“We propose so resisting [the Dred Scott decision] as to have it reversed if we can, and a 
new judicial rule established upon this subject.”). 
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stare decisis—an extracanonical principle that itself creates gradations of 
entrenchment depending on a variety of variables.250 
Just as judicial invalidation of statutes stems from Article V’s entrenchment 
of the canonical Constitution, so too relative entrenchment generates 
additional forms of judicial review. Courts thus review administrative agency 
rules for conformity to underlying statutes,251 informal agency actions for 
conformity with legislative rules,252 and state laws for conformity with federal 
law in all its forms.253 Neither the “trumping” function of higher law nor its 
enforcement by courts is confined to the canonical document; rather, each 
propagates all the way down the legal food chain. 
Relative entrenchment matters. A primary function of the extracanonical 
constitution is to define when the law can be changed by executive actors alone, 
and when change requires new legislation. In areas where the canonical 
Constitution itself imposes relatively little restraint on government action, 
these statutory entrenchment debates are likely to assume primary importance. 
In Gonzales v. Oregon, for instance, the lack of consensus at the national level on 
physician-assisted suicide means that Congress is quite unlikely to act on the 
matter. The Court’s holding that the executive may not act unilaterally thus 
reserves the matter to the states for the foreseeable future. Likewise, while 
Congress did act to empower the President to use military commissions after 
Hamdan, the powers that Congress was willing to give in the Military 
 
250.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (articulating a multifactor test to evaluate the weight of stare decisis in 
constitutional cases); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (indicating that stare 
decisis carries more weight in statutory cases than in constitutional ones). 
251.  See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (holding portions of FCC rules 
implementing the local competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), invalid on the 
ground that they were inconsistent with the underlying Act). 
252.  See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (reviewing the Secretary of Labor’s informal 
interpretation of a legislative rule implementing the Fair Labor Standards Act for conformity 
with both the statute and the legislative rule). 
253.  See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (holding state 
law preempted by federal banking regulations issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (holding state law preempted by the 
federal common law of admiralty). This is not to concede that all forms of federal law 
should have the same preemptive effect. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and 
Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004) (suggesting limits on the preemptive effects of 
agency actions); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption of State Law, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (arguing that federal agency action should preempt state law only 
where Congress delegates authority to act with the force of law).  
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Commissions Act254 were considerably more circumscribed than those the 
President had sought to take unilaterally. Especially during periods when 
different political parties control the executive and legislative branches, or 
when power in Congress is closely divided, these relative entrenchment 
questions will exercise an enormous influence on the shape of our institutions 
and the direction of the law. 
As I have already suggested,255 moreover, formal entrenchment is not the 
only kind. The Social Security Act is functionally more entrenched, at least right 
now, than the First Amendment’s prohibition on flag burning. The formal 
process for overturning a particular norm is simply one variable among 
many—an important one, to be sure—that bear on the difficulty of altering that 
norm. Karl Llewellyn, for instance, urged attention to the preferences and 
practices of legal specialists, interest groups, and the general public in 
determining which institutional arrangements should be considered 
constitutionally entrenched.256 This is not the place for exploring the variety 
and force of those and other functional variables. The point is simply that 
decoupling the constitutive function of constitutional norms from their degree 
of formal entrenchment opens up a whole range of additional lines of inquiry 
into what legal “entrenchment” may mean. 
iii. the functional boundaries of constitutional law 
Recognizing the constitutive role of ordinary law sheds light not only on 
how the Constitution changes, but also on how we should implement and 
think about the Constitution at the present time. This last Part offers a few 
illustrative examples concerning both how certain doctrinal questions should 
be resolved and, more broadly, how the extracanonical constitution might 
change how we teach and write about constitutional law. 
A. Doctrine 
The law distinguishes sharply between constitutional and 
nonconstitutional norms in any number of areas. The distinction has been 
important in at least two areas of federal courts doctrine and scholarship: 
constitutional limitations on Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
 
254.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 
2600 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950s). 
255.  See supra Subsection I.A.3.  
256.  See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 19. 
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federal courts, and the availability of private remedies against state officers 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Likewise, standard approaches to statutory 
construction tend to distinguish sharply between statutory and constitutional 
construction for purposes of consulting constitutional values and deferring to 
administrative agencies. In each of these contexts, recognizing the constitutive 
functions of ordinary legislation suggests that the dichotomy between 
canonical and noncanonical law should be less important than it is often 
argued to be. 
1. Two Federal Courts Puzzles 
The extent of Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts is one of the imponderable mysteries of federal courts law. It is also an 
issue of enormous contemporary relevance, as the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996,257 the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,258 and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006259 are arguably the most significant 
instances of jurisdiction stripping enacted since Reconstruction. Discussion of 
the constitutional limits, if any, on such legislation often begins with Henry 
Hart’s famous statement that restrictions on the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction “must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme 
Court in the constitutional plan.”260 Following Professor Hart, other scholars 
have sought to identify the “essential functions” of not only the Supreme Court 
but of the federal courts in general. One of the most influential miners of this 
vein, Larry Sager, has argued that the essential function of the federal courts is 
to ensure that both state and federal governmental actors comply with 
constitutional norms. The limit to Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping authority 
is thus that it cannot divest the federal judicial system of constitutional 
claims.261 
The extracanonical constitution undermines Dean Sager’s argument by 
challenging its sharp dichotomy between constitutional claims and other rights 
claims predicated on federal law. Sager’s argument largely seems to take the 
 
257.  Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified principally in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
258.  Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 10 U.S.C. § 801 note, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd, 2000dd-1). 
259.  2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 2600. 
260.  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953). 
261.  Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations 
on Congress’ Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 45, 
66-67 (1981). 
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primacy of constitutional claims for granted.262 Yet the reasons he gives for the 
enforcement of such claims as an “essential function” seem equally applicable 
to claims under the extracanonical constitution. With respect to judicial review 
of state conduct, he observes that “the Supreme Court’s superintendence of 
state compliance with national law emerged as the fulcrum of the national 
government.”263 Maintaining the supremacy of national law, however, is as 
much a concern for federal statutory and regulatory law as it is for 
constitutional norms. Sager also argues that 
[f]ederal judicial supervision of state conduct is particularly important 
because of the daily impact of state and local government on the lives of 
individuals, and because the actions of those governments are 
particularly rich with constitutional hazard. States or their municipal 
constituents register voters, run public schools, control access to speech 
opportunities, employ the police personnel with whom citizens 
regularly have contact, regulate the use of land, license professionals, 
and regulate families.264 
I have already argued, however, that federal statutory rights will often play a 
more important role in the lives of individuals, practically speaking, than 
constitutional ones. Indeed, the examples Sager gives—registering voters, 
running public schools, etc.—are for the most part now heavily regulated 
under federal statutory schemes.  
Turning to federal judicial review of federal conduct, Dean Sager argues 
from the value of judicial independence. His claim is that congressional ouster 
of federal constitutional claims against federal action would leave those claims 
in the state courts, and that this would “run roughshod over article III’s tenure 
and salary requirements.”265 But Sager’s argument is primarily concerned with 
the unsuitability of the state courts as an alternative forum for federal claims. 
This could be even more true of federal statutory or regulatory claims, which 
 
262.  At one point, Dean Sager cites Alexander Hamilton for the proposition that federal courts 
were “a necessary part of the [constitutional] plan” because of their importance in deciding 
“causes arising out of the national Constitution.” Id. at 67 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, 
at 507-08 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)). In this instance, 
however, Sager’s usual hostility to originalism, see SAGER, supra note 204, at 42-69, would 
have been well-founded. Hamilton wrote, after all, before the proliferation of federal 
statutory rights and regulatory bureaucracies; his views on the relative importance of 
constitutional and statutory claims are considerably less relevant today. 
263.  Sager, supra note 261, at 51. 
264.  Id. at 55 n.112. 
265.  Id. at 66. 
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will often be more complex and unfamiliar to state judges, than it is of 
constitutional claims. In any event, if one concedes that statutes and 
regulations perform constitutive functions that are just as practically important 
as those performed by the canonical Constitution, then it is hard to see why 
judicial independence would be any more important for constitutional claims 
than for constitutive statutory ones. 
To say this much is not to prescribe a particular solution to the problem of 
constitutional limits on jurisdiction stripping. My point is simply that 
wherever the boundary lies, it should not be predicated on a sharp distinction 
between constitutional and statutory claims—or, more precisely, between 
claims under the canonical Constitution and claims under the extracanonical 
one. I have argued elsewhere that the best way to enforce Article III limits in 
this area is through very strong clear-statement rules. That approach has the 
virtue of applying to efforts to restrict jurisdiction over the whole range of 
possible claims—not just canonical ones.266 
Softening the distinction between constitutional and statutory claims also 
sheds light on an important controversy concerning the remedies for violations 
of federal rights. The primary federal statute providing individuals with a right 
of action for violations of their federal rights by state and local officials is 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which was originally enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act in 
1871.267 The current version of the statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .268 
In Maine v. Thiboutot,269 the Supreme Court interpreted § 1983’s reference 
to “the Constitution and laws” broadly to cover violations of any federal statute. 
That holding, however, has been criticized by commentators270 and narrowed 
 
266.  See Young, supra note 128, at 1602-13. 
267.  Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
268.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
269.  448 U.S. 1 (1980).  
270.  See, e.g., David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 551 
(1997) (commenting that overruling Thiboutot would be “no great tragedy” because the 
decision misinterpreted § 1983); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 104 
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significantly in recent decisions by the Rehnquist Court. Recognizing the 
broad constitutive functions played by statutory and regulatory materials, 
however, provides a strong functional argument for adhering to Thiboutot’s 
holding. 
The argument against Thiboutot stems from the early history of the statute. 
When it was originally enacted in 1871, § 1983 reached only the deprivation of 
constitutional rights. Congress added the “and laws” language in 1874, at the 
same time that it severed the 1871 Act’s jurisdictional provisions from its 
substantive provisions and placed them in separate sections of the code. The 
jurisdictional provision, which became 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), conferred 
federal jurisdiction only over constitutional rights and “by any Act of Congress 
providing for equal rights.”271 Thiboutot’s critics have argued that the more 
terse “and laws” formulation of the substantive provision should be read as 
“coextensive” with the scope of § 1343(a)(3).272 The Thiboutot majority rejected 
this argument, however, on the ground that the history of the statute was too 
ambiguous to support a departure from its plain language.273 
Thiboutot’s holding has come under pressure in recent years as a result of 
the Rehnquist Court’s general skepticism of private rights of action and suits 
against state governments.274 Gonzaga University v. Doe,275 for example, rejected 
a § 1983 claim against state officials for violations of the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) on the ground that the relevant FERPA 
provisions did not create individually enforceable rights. And City of Rancho 
Palos Verdes v. Abrams276 held that when Congress creates a specific (and 
usually more narrow) statutory remedy for violations of statutory rights, those 
claims will generally not be cognizable under § 1983. Dissenting in Gonzaga, 
Justice Stevens protested that the Court had “eroded—if not eviscerated—the 
 
(1994) (“Thiboutot's view of section 1983 remains vulnerable to attack.”); Ellen D. Katz, 
State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe and Printz, 1998 WIS. 
L. REV. 1465, 1490 n.118 (“The product of a divided Court, Thiboutot was and remains a 
controversial decision.”).  
271.  28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (2000). 
272.  See, e.g., Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 20-21 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
273.  See id. at 7-8 (majority opinion). 
274.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (sharply limiting implied private rights 
of action under federal statutes); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that 
Congress may not generally override state sovereign immunity when it creates remedies for 
violations of federal statutes). 
275.  536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
276.  544 U.S. 113 (2005). 
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long-established principle of presumptive enforceability of rights under § 
1983.”277 
If, unlike the Thiboutot majority, one finds the history of the statute and its 
relationship between § 1983 and § 1343(a)(3) conclusive, then my functional 
argument here would not necessarily be sufficient to support a broader 
interpretation. But the historical critique has generally been paired with a 
policy argument that Thiboutot supports unduly broad rights to litigate under a 
virtually infinite range of federal statutes, many of which have relatively little 
to do with the core purposes of the federal civil rights remedy.278 My account of 
the extracanonical constitution, however, suggests that federal statutory rights 
will often play just as “fundamental” a role as constitutional ones from the 
perspective of the citizen. Thiboutot itself involved a denial of welfare benefits—
positive rights that it may be difficult to include in an entrenched constitution 
but that may, practically speaking, be far more important to individuals than, 
say, the First Amendment right to burn the flag. Where statutory rights play 
this sort of constitutive role, it seems comparatively easy to fit their 
enforcement against state actors within the core purpose of § 1983. 
The Rehnquist Court’s cases limiting Thiboutot are not necessarily wrong 
under my approach here. The recent cases finding that particular statutes do 
not create individually enforceable rights under § 1983 have involved the 
private enforcement of provisions in conditional spending arrangements 
between the national government and the states.279 Such provisions are 
plausibly viewed as not performing the constitutive function of conferring 
rights on individuals, but rather as contractual terms of agreements between 
state and federal authorities. As such, it makes sense that they are enforceable 
only by the parties to the agreements. Likewise, the ability of Congress to 
supersede the general § 1983 remedy by providing a narrower remedial 
framework stems inevitably from the formally unentrenched nature of 
statutory rights. As a matter of doctrine, it is hard to argue with either 
principle. 
The perspective offered here might matter, however, to the extent that it 
affects the disposition with which courts approach these statutory questions 
under § 1983. The principles that statutes must create individually enforceable 
rights and that a more specific remedial scheme may supersede § 1983 are 
sensible enough on their own terms. But they are principles that may be 
 
277.  536 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
278.  See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
279.  See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 278 (noting that the FERPA requirements in question 
were enacted as a condition under the spending power, and that the sole remedy prescribed 
by the statute was the withholding of federal funds). 
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applied either more or less aggressively: one may, as a matter of doctrinal 
application, raise or lower the threshold for finding an individually enforceable 
right, or be more or less ready to find that Congress intended a specific 
statutory remedy to supersede the § 1983 framework. The comparatively 
aggressive recent application of these principles may reflect a more general 
sense that these federal statutory claims are not what § 1983 is really for.280 It is 
that general claim that I want to dispute: where federal statutory rights play a 
similar functional role to canonical constitutional rights, the imperative to 
provide a federal statutory cause of action to enforce them is equally 
compelling. 
2. The Continuity of Interpretation 
My final suggestions concern two issues regarding the interpretation of 
constitutive statutes by courts. I argue first that, where a statutory scheme 
plays a constitutive role in the constitutional structure, courts should not 
hesitate to employ normative canons of statutory construction that reflect the 
constitutional values underlying the relevant aspect of the structure. Second, 
courts should be reluctant to accord Chevron deference to statutory 
interpretations by administrative agencies where the statute in question plays a 
constitutive role. 
Gonzales v. Oregon readily illustrates the first point.281 The majority’s 
interpretation of the scope of authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney 
General under the Controlled Substances Act282 was plainly influenced by 
federalism-based assumptions concerning the traditional and proper allocation 
of regulatory authority over the medical profession.283 In dissent, Justice 
Thomas objected to the importation of this federalism-based judgment into a 
statutory case: 
I agree with limiting the applications of the CSA in a manner consistent 
with the principles of federalism and our constitutional structure. . . . 
 
280.  It seems clear that the quite aggressive application of similar principles to limit the federal 
common law remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violations of constitutional rights by federal officials stems 
from a general discomfort with judge-made implied rights of action. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (strongly resisting any extension of the Bivens remedy 
to new contexts). 
281.  546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
282.  21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000). 
283.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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But that is now water over the dam. The relevance of such 
considerations was at its zenith in Raich, when we considered whether 
the CSA could be applied to the intrastate possession of a controlled 
substance [medical marijuana] consistent with the limited federal 
powers enumerated by the Constitution. Such considerations have 
little, if any, relevance where, as here, we are merely presented with a 
question of statutory interpretation, and not the extent of 
constitutionally permissible federal power.284 
Justice Thomas thus concluded that “[t]he Court’s reliance upon the 
constitutional principles that it rejected in Raich—albeit under the guise of 
statutory interpretation—is perplexing to say the least.”285 
It is easy to sympathize with Justice Thomas’s dissent. “Where were you 
people in Raich,” he asks of the majority, “when this Court interpreted the 
Constitution to authorize basically unlimited national legislation?” But with all 
respect to Thomas’s principled stand in Raich, I want to suggest that he 
overlooks the critical constitutive function of statutory construction in cases 
like Gonzales and Rapanos. The obsolescence of canonical boundaries for 
national power means that statutory boundaries like those in the CSA and the 
Clean Water Act will increasingly define the federal balance. The same thing is 
true of separation of powers in cases like Hamdan, and of individual rights 
values in cases like Gonzales and Rapanos where the courts are unwilling to 
recognize a fundamental rights claim. If this is correct, then it is not simply 
permissible for constitutional values to inform statutory construction in such 
cases through normative canons of construction—it is essential.286 
The question of agency deference looms equally large in such cases, because 
statutory debate will often focus on the extent to which a given statutory 
boundary can be interpreted or modified by the enforcing agency. Here the 
deference rules reflect a sharp dichotomy between constitutional and statutory 
construction. There is no question of deference to agency interpretations of the 
canonical Constitution, yet the tradition of deference to agency statutory 
constructions is both broad and deep. My point is that when a statute is 
 
284.  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 301-02 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 
2195, 2229 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
285.  Id. at 302. 
286.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 164 (“[R]elatively aggressive statutory construction 
provides a way for courts to vindicate norms that do in fact have constitutional status, and 
to do so in a less intrusive way than constitutional adjudication.”); Young, supra note 128, at 
1585-99. 
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playing a constitutive role, the usual reluctance to defer on constitutional 
questions should also extend to the statutory one. 
That does not mean that every aspect of a vast, constitutive regulatory 
scheme like the Clean Water Act is off limits to Chevron deference. Much of the 
statutory law under such a scheme will consist simply of substantive rules, 
which play little constitutive role. Deference to agency interpretations of such 
provisions would remain appropriate. I do submit, however, that longstanding 
debates about whether Chevron should cover agency interpretations of the 
limits of the agency’s own jurisdiction or agency judgments about the 
preemption of state law should generally be resolved against deference.287 
One might object that suspending ordinary Chevron deference when 
constitutive statutes are at issue is tantamount to according special status to 
those statutes. This would raise the problem noted earlier, which is that any 
proposal to accord special status to constitutive laws would require relatively 
precise, determinate boundaries for the favored category.288 But I am not 
proposing any new categories here. There is already a longstanding debate on 
the question of whether Chevron deference should apply to agency 
constructions of the limits of their own jurisdiction.289 While it is true that “it 
may be difficult to distinguish issues of jurisdiction from other issues of agency 
authority,”290 that is a far narrower (and hence more manageable) question 
than identifying “constitutive” norms generally. In any event, my argument 
here injects no new category into that debate, but rather proposes an argument 
for how a debate over preexisting categories should be resolved. 
Likewise, we already have well-established canons of statutory construction 
designed to protect constitutional values concerning both structure291 and 
 
287.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 143 (arguing that the abandonment of the constitutional 
delegation doctrine presupposes judicial enforcement of the statutory limits of agency 
action, and that “[i]f agencies are able to interpret ambiguities in these directives, the 
delegation problem increases dramatically”). 
288.  See supra Section II.A. 
289.  Compare, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is settled law that the rule of deference applies even to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.”), with id. at 386-87 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our agency deference cases have always been limited to statutes 
the agency was ‘entrusted to administer.’ . . . Agencies do not ‘administer’ statutes confining 
the scope of their jurisdiction, and such statutes are not ‘entrusted’ to agencies. Nor do the 
normal reasons for agency deference apply.”). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. 
MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 
817-19 (2003) (surveying the debate). 
290.  MASHAW ET AL., supra note 289, at 818.  
291.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that Congress must speak clearly 
if it wishes to regulate the traditional functions of state governments); Cass R. Sunstein, 
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individual rights.292 The boundaries within which these canons should apply 
are not always perfectly determinate, but they are also not hopelessly vague. 
The debate about such canons is not so much when they are potentially 
applicable, but rather whether they should apply at all in cases where there is 
not an actual violation of the underlying canonical principle.293 My answer has 
been to say that constitutional and statutory construction are functionally 
continuous—both are vehicles that protect important constitutional values. 
The import of the argument is thus not to pose yet another difficult doctrinal 
distinction, but rather to dispense with an unhelpful limit on the range of these 
canons’ application. 
B. Pedagogy and Scholarship 
Changing what counts as “the Constitution” should affect how we think 
about teaching and scholarship in the field of constitutional law. In this brief 
concluding Section, I want to note three points about pedagogy and scholarly 
inquiry. First, we need to question not only the American law school 
curriculum’s continuing (albeit declining) neglect of regulatory law and 
statutory interpretation, but also the rigid divide between constitutional and 
nonconstitutional subjects that characterizes much of our traditional 
curriculum. The result might look something more like British courses in 
“public law,” with the relative entrenchment of various legal norms being 
simply one object of inquiry among many. Second, the extracanonical 
constitution is a creature of doctrinal detail, and the theoretical issues that it 
raises emerge only after one becomes familiar with the contours of intricate 
statutory schemes. That might cause us to question the divide between 
theoretical and doctrinal inquiry that characterizes some constitutional 
scholarship. Finally, the relative mutability of the extracanonical constitution 
suggests that institutional design questions are more relevant to American 
constitutional law than one might think if one views the content of our 
“constitution” as relatively fixed. 
 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (collecting canons that limit delegated 
power). 
292.  See, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952) (rule of 
lenity). On clear statement rules, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, 
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 593 (1992). 
293.  See generally Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 
SUP. CT. REV. 71; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997). 
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Discussion of the “canon” in constitutional law often addresses whether we 
should teach this case or that, or whether we should spend more time 
addressing constitutional decision making by actors outside the courts. But it 
rarely confronts the more basic question asked here—that is, what should 
count as “the Constitution”? There are exceptions, of course, such as the 
encouraging trend to treat federal statutory preemption of state law as a 
constitutional issue to be taught as part of a more general discussion of 
constitutional federalism.294 Casebooks on foreign affairs law likewise discuss 
constitutive statutory and common law rules like the Alien Tort Statute295 and 
the act of state doctrine, respectively, alongside constitutional rules governing 
war and treaty powers.296 And federal courts casebooks have generally put the 
constitutive interplay of statutes and constitutional provisions front and 
center—for example, in the treatment of federal question jurisdiction under 
Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.297 
Generally speaking, however, statutory and regulatory materials are rarely 
included in courses on constitutional law. At the University of Texas, we offer a 
course on equal protection doctrine and a course on the employment 
discrimination statutes, but there is not nearly as much overlap as one might 
think. We should at least consider an integrated course addressing the 
fundamental importance of rights against discrimination in the context of race, 
gender, age, disability, etc., without drawing sharp lines based on the 
derivation of those rights from statutes or constitutional provisions. Such an 
approach would afford not only the practical advantage of conveying a more 
complete picture of one’s legal options in a particular set of circumstances, but 
also opportunities to talk about the respective advantages and disadvantages of 
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory tools in addressing a common set of 
constitutive issues. 
From the standpoint of scholarship, I have canvassed only a small fraction 
of the theoretical and doctrinal issues one might explore by defining the 
constitution in a functional way. I want to make two broader points, however. 
 
294.  See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 324-33 (15th 
ed. 2004). At the same time, it is worth noting that the same casebook gives two-and-a-half 
times as much space to the anticommandeering doctrine and National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as it does to preemption, see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra, at 179-
204, notwithstanding their negligible importance relative to statutory preemption in 
ordering the relation between state and federal authority. 
295.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
296.  See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 90-111 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the act of state doctrine); id. at 502-22 
(discussing the Alien Tort Statute). 
297.  See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 171, at 832-905. 
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One has to do with the theory-versus-doctrine debate that presently divides the 
academy from the profession and members of many law faculties from one 
another.298 There are certain fundamental theoretical perspectives that emerge 
only when one pays careful attention to doctrine. One does not need to know 
much doctrine to puzzle about the proper interpretive theory for approaching 
the Constitution’s open-ended rights-bearing provisions. But to see how the 
Clean Water Act or the Communications Act operates as a “constitution” of 
sorts, one needs to know a bit about the nuts and bolts of the relevant statutes. 
Respect for doctrine is thus not just an imperative of faculty comity, but may in 
fact reveal a trove of theoretical insights. 
The second point is that expanding our conception of “the Constitution” 
may encourage us to think of our institutional arrangements as less fixed than 
we often do. To a great extent, our constitutive arrangements are not 
entrenched to the point that they would require a formal amendment—or a 
constitutional “moment”—to alter. That means that our opportunities to think 
about constitutional design are not limited to those heady occasions when 
prominent scholars are invited to some exotic island in the South Pacific and 
asked to help design a new constitution. Many fairly basic issues of 
constitutional design arise in the creation of new statutory schemes or the 
alteration of old ones, and how we resolve those issues in turn will shape the 
overall structure of our constitution outside the Constitution. 
There is an important current debate, for example, about delegations of 
legislative, executive, and judicial authority from domestic to supranational 
institutions. The legislative functions of the World Trade Organization, the 
investigative functions of inspectors under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
and the adjudicative functions of arbitral tribunals under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement are just a few examples of this increasingly salient issue. 
Thus far, much of the academic debate about the validity of such supranational 
delegations has sought to fit them into categories defined by the canonical 
Constitution. Critics have thus invoked the classic nondelegation doctrine, the 
Appointments Clause, and constitutional limits on the assignment of federal 
judicial business to non-Article III tribunals as tools for evaluating 
supranational delegations.299 The problem is that each of these canonical 
 
298.  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
299.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to 
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); 
Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 
(2004); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998).  
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principles was developed to deal with quite different concerns than those that 
they are now called upon to address, and they tend to map poorly onto the 
issues raised by supranational delegations. 
Recognizing the pervasive significance of extracanonical materials in 
structuring our governmental institutions might relieve the felt pressure to 
address every new problem in terms of preexisting canonical rules. Rather than 
strain the non-Article III courts doctrine to govern an international tribunal, 
why not simply write about how such a tribunal should be structured (by 
treaty) in the first place, or propose a statute to govern the effect of such a 
tribunal’s pronouncements on domestic law?300 Such a treaty or statute would 
perform a constitutional function, and insights gleaned from the study of 
canonical structures may pose helpful analogies for institutional reform and 
design. I suspect that part of the reason we do not see more scholarship in this 
vein is a sense that proposing legislative solutions is not “constitutional” 
scholarship, even when the problems to be solved are constitutive in nature. 
This perception, coupled with the virtual impossibility of formally amending 
the canonical document itself, has gone a long way toward stifling interest in 
institutional design among constitutional scholars. But statutes and treaties—
even regulations and informal governmental practices—do constitutional work 
all the time, and it is time constitutional scholars paid more attention to them. 
conclusion 
If you seek the Constitution, look around you. It is much bigger than you 
think. If we look for it through functional eyes—that is, if we seek to identify 
the set of legal norms that actually constitute our public legal order—then the 
“Constitution” will include not only the canonical document but a host of 
statutes, regulatory materials, federal common law rules, and established 
practices. This Article has only scratched the surface of the theoretical, 
doctrinal, and pedagogical implications of viewing constitutionalism from this 
perspective. The basic point, however, should be clear: constitutional scholars 
need to quit drawing rigid lines around the legal materials that interest them—
and hence around their scholarly discipline—and engage the constitution 
outside the Constitution. 
 
300.  I have pursued this recommendation in other work. See Ernest A. Young, Toward a 
Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2007). 
